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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In recent years Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) and Valuation Adjustments
(XVA) dramatically changed both derivative pricing and risk management
paradigms. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, it became clear that
neither high creditworthiness institutions could be considered default-free any
more. CCR is the risk which economic agents face due to the possible default of
their over the counter (OTC) counterparts occurring prior to the full compliance
of contractual payments. Since no financial or corporate entity can be considered
entirely default-free any more, CCR affects bilaterally OTC trades. XVA is the
growing family of valuation adjustments due to CCR and other risks related to
funding and collateral margining.
The scope of my Doctoral Thesis is to jointly address the topics of CCR and
XVA through a common structural approach for default modelling. The work is
composed by three linked Chapters. Within each of them, I provide a specific
literature review of related arguments. In my Doctoral Thesis it is discussed a case
study, accompanied by numerical analysis, based on the commodity asset class.
In available Counterparty Credit Risk literature, reduced-form models have been
widely preferred to structural ones because of their superior degree of analytical
tractability. On the other side, structural models had typically struggled in
calibrating non null CDS market implied default probabilities for very short
maturities. Nevertheless, by the joint application of a suited underlying credit
model and state-of-the-art numerical techniques, it is possible to replicate non
zero short-term default probabilities and as a consequence, non zero short-term
CCR valuation adjustments.
Chapter 1 relates to the literature of pure CCR valuation adjustments, since
it is dedicated to the estimation of bilateral Counterparty Credit Risk metrics,
known as Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) and Debit Valuation Adjustments
(DVA). I inherit from Ballotta and Fusai (2015) the use of a first-passage type
default model in which the bankruptcy is defined as the first passage time of
the firm value from the level of a predetermined lower barrier. Unlike the cited
Authors, I prefer to elect equity as convenient proxy for the firm creditworthiness
because of its tradability. A pure jump Le`vy process obtained by brownian
subordination is used to describe both the market and credit parts of the
model. In other words, the economy is modelled through the Normal Inverse
Gaussian (NIG) process proposed by Barndorff-Nielsen (1997). In the Chapter,
I derived a simple model-independent formula representing the bilateral CCR
adjustments. Unlike Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) and others, in my analysis no
particular assumption for the hedging strategy is required. Such representation
holds for both structural and reduced-form approaches of default modelling.
In the numerical case study based on crude oil and natural gas, the Fourier
Cosine Series (COS) method for European Option introduced by Fang and
Oosterlee (2008) has been chosen for computing exposures at default (EAD).
Furthermore, a contribution of the first Chapter is to extend the COS method
for the estimation of EAD for Forward and Swap contracts. The COS method
for CDS introduced by Fang et al. (2010) has been adopted for calibrating the
credit part of the framework, including the default barriers. For the sake of
calculating CVAs and DVAs upon a basket commodity derivatives negotiated
between two defaultable counterparts, a first-to-default setting is addressed via
joint Monte Carlo simulation of their equity dynamics.
Chapter 2 falls in the context of additional valuation adjustments literature
as I tried to single out the economic role played by the other members of
the XVA family, i.e. the Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA) and Initial
Margin Valuation Adjustment (MVA). The FVA, interpretable as the risk-neutral
expectation of hedging financing costs, introduces a high degree of complexity,
nonlinearity and recursivity. Nevertheless, I tried to simplify as possible the
framework in order to understand whether FVA should affect fair valuation. In a
reversed perspective, instead of adding funding related cash flows to those of the
derivative payoff as Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) and others, I prefer to firstly
understand the nature of the FVA term, retracing in some cases the analysis of
Andersen et al. (2017). The MVA represents the risk-neutral expectation of Initial
Margin (IM) financing costs and is asked by Central Clearing Counterparties
(CCP) in order to mitigate additional risks due to extreme events. Strictly
speaking, MVA is a relevant funding cost affecting both the micro point of view,
in terms of pricing, and the macro point of view, in terms of systemic liquidity
effects.
Chapter 3 configures as extension of my general structural model and relies
on the inclusion of some additional features such as collateral and recovery risk.
The effectiveness two different collateralization schemes has been compared in
numerical experiments. A possibly original contribution of the third Chapter
can be retrieved in the incorporation of stochastic recovery rates since, to my
knowledge, stochastic recoveries has been scarcely investigated in the context of
Counterparty Credit Risk. A valuable attempt aimed at estimating stochastic
recovery rates for the Black and Cox (1976) model can be recovered in the
work of Cohen and Costanzino (2017). However, their analysis is not applied
to the pricing of CCR. In the Chapter, I propose a simple procedure to model
state-dependent stochastic recovery rates, which reflects the severity of occurred
defaults in terms of relative distance from the default barrier. It is underlined the
relation between the underlying volatility and the expected value of stochastic
recoveries. Moreover, I perform a sensitivity analysis of pure CCR adjustments
with respect to credit and volatility shocks, highlighting some interesting asymp-
totic patterns. Finally, in the attempt of reconnecting CCR pricing to economic
fundamentals and understand how much market and accounting information de-
viate, I propose an alternative default barrier calibration based on balance-sheet
data.
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1. LE`VY STRUCTURAL PRICING OF BILATERAL
COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK (CCR)
ABSTRACT
The global financial crisis revealed that no economic entity can be considered
default-free any more. Because of that, both banks and corporations have to deal
with bilateral Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) in their OTC derivatives trades.
Such evidence implies the fair pricing of these risks, namely the Credit Valuation
Adjustment (CVA) and its counterpart, the Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA).
Despite the more commonly used reduced-form approach, in this work the random
default time is addressed via a structural approach a` la Black and Cox (1976),
so that the bankruptcy of a given firm is modelled as the first-passage time of
its equity value from a predetermined lower barrier. As in Ballotta et al. (2015),
I make use of a time-changed Le`vy process as underlying source of both market
and credit risk. The main advantage of this setup relies on its superior capability
to replicate non null short-term default probabilities, unlike pure diffusion models.
Moreover, a numerical computation of the valuation adjustments for bilateral
CCR in the context of energy commodities OTC derivatives contracts has been
performed.
Keywords: Counterparty Credit Risk, Le`vy Processes, Jumps, First-passage
Models, Fourier Pricing, COS, CVA, DVA, Energy Commodities.
1.1 Introduction
The Counteparty Credit Risk (CCR) is the potential risk for a given counterpart
A to incur in losses caused by the default by its counterpart B before the
expiry of the contract. The peculiarity of CCR with respect to usual Credit
Risk relates to the stochastic nature of future exposures typical of derivatives
payoffs. Conceptually, this type of risk refers mainly to over the counter (OTC)
derivatives trades since, into regulated markets the presence of Clearing Houses
prevents the occurring of big insolvencies1. The 2008 global financial crisis
revealed that no economic entity can be supposed to be default-free any more.
As a consequence both banks and corporations have to cope with the CCR in
their OTC derivatives trades, i.e. Counterparty Credit Risk shows a bilateral
nature.
The reason for my interest in the commodity asset class arises from some
overview studies, for instance the one by ESMA (2017). In that paper, according
to European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) weekly data on the size
and structure of EU derivatives markets, which includes informations concerning
financial and corporate entities, 305,685 different counterparts were reported to
negotiate over the commodity asset class. This makes commodities the largest
sector in terms of market participants. This is not surprising given to the
widespread use of these contracts across many industries and types of counter-
parts, often non financials. The average notional amount of commodity trades
is lower compared to other asset classes, reflecting the wide use of commodity
derivatives also by small non-financial firms such as commodity producers or
users managing their commodity price risk. Comparatively high level of con-
centration can be observed on the commodity sector, which in 2016 accounted
for the 14% of the overall EU derivatives market, where many non-financial
corporations interact with few large brokers.
In this study I make use of the approach suggested by Ballotta et al. (2015),
who modelled the random default time within a structural approach a la` Black
and Cox (1976), meaning that the bankruptcy is defined as the first-passage
time in which the firm value hits a predetermined down barrier. In their work,
Ballotta et al. (2015), proposed a time-changed Levy process as underlying source
of both market and credit risk. The inclusion of such a skewed, leptokurtic
pure jump stochastic process is motivated by its superior capability to replicate
non null short-term default probabilities compared to pure diffusion models.
Indeed, that theoretical framework does not provide downward-biased short
term default probabilities and as a consequence, downward-biased CCR metrics.
While the characteristic function of Le`vy processes is always recoverable thanks
to the well known Le`vy-Khintchine Representation, since most of times their
probability density function (PDF) is not available in closed form, the numerical
application of the present model requires the use of some Fourier-based pricing
1 Actually under the Dodd-Frank act, Central Clearing Counterparts (CCPs) became
mandatory also for all inter-dealers OTC trades executed post September 2016 (BCBS 2013).
Nevertheless, the CCR is still a major concern for both financial and corporate firms operating
in those markets.
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methodologies.
1.1.1 Brief literature review of structural CCR models and wrong-way risk
The present subsection contains a brief review of the existing literature on
structural models applied in the context of Counterparty Credit Risk and some
insights of previous work on CCR relative to commodity derivatives. Furthermore,
it is provided a discussion of default dependences as well as market-credit
correlations in order to allow the introduction of wrong-way risk.
The distinction between structural and reduced-form models of default risk
relates to how a credit event is modelled. A credit event is broadly defined
both as the default of a given entity or as a noticeable deterioration in its
creditworthiness impacting on its ability to pay back the entire market value of
its outstanding monetary obligations.
While structural models aim at explaining the occurring of a credit event
as the economic mechanism leading to the total assets of a given firm not to
be sufficient to face its total liabilities, reduced-form models (also known as
intensity-based models) configure a default as an unexpected event occurring
according to some probabilistic law. In general, reduced-form models have been
widely preferred to structural models particularly in the context of Counteparty
Credit Risk because of their higher degree of analytical tractability, a desirable
feature when dealing with very complex objects such as the CVA and the DVA.
Furthermore, structural models have been considered unsuitable or uncom-
fortable to be used for the computation of additional valuation adjustments such
as the Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA) and the Initial Margin Valuation
Adjustment (MVA), among others. As regards the advantages of structural
models, since they suggest default processes are entirely driven by the default-free
market information, they are well suited to evaluate hybrid equity-credit products
and to quantify Counterparty Credit Risk in equity derivatives. Moreover, when
considering correlation among the entities involved and the underlying, structural
models better describe the full structure of dependences without the necessity
to impose exogenous copula functions otherwise necessary in intensity-based
models.
Moving from the former work of Merton (1974) to more sophisticated clas-
sical first-passage type frameworks such as that of Black and Cox (1976), all
structural models have typically assumed that the value of the firm follows a
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). Among others, the lognormality assump-
tion has been considered robust by KMV2 empirical studies, see Brigo et al.
(2013). Nevertheless, the lognormality assumption in classical structural models
implies the impossibility to replicate non-null default probabilities for very short
maturities. This is another crucial constraint in comparison with the competitive
reduced-form approach. Last but not least, traditional first-passage type models
for long time have appeared to be not flexible enough to properly calibrate the
term structure of credit curves. This led to the introduction of other models
2 The firm KMV is named after Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek, the founders of the
company in 2002. It has then been sold to Moody’s.
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in which the volatility parameter is time-dependent and crucial to determine
the time-varying level of curved default barriers. Those models can be viewed
as extensions of the Black and Cox model. The joint objective of allowing for
a more flexible setup while maintaining the possibility to derive closed-form
solutions similar to the ones known in the context of Barrier Options pricing,
has represented a technical challenge for long time. I refer to the work of Brigo
et al. (2011), where the Authors apply the Analytically-Tractable First-Passage
(AT1F) model and the Scenario Barrier Time-Varying Volatility (SBTV) model
within a study based on Lehman Brothers default. While the first considers a
deterministic barrier the latter, in order to take into account the uncertainty
involved in balance sheet information, introduces different scenarios for the initial
level of the default barrier.
In the Analytically-Tractable First-Passage (AT1F) model, the dynamics
of the firm value is described by a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). The
default barrier level is proportional to the firm’s leverage-ratio3 at the outset,
the expected future value of the firm and dependent on the time-varying volatil-
ity parameter. Under such model, survival and default probabilities are still
analytically recoverable in closed-form, see Brigo et al. (2011) for more details.
In that model, the equation describing survival probabilities shows a one-to-one
mapping between them and the time-dependent volatility levels. Being the other
parameters fixed exogenously, volatility drives the theoretical fair CDS quotes
produced by the model. Although the determination of the capital structure
of the company is out of the scope of calibration procedure, which rather aims
at matching risk-neutral default probabilities implied in the market, structural
modelling might be interpreted as a tool to assess the economic coherence of
calibration outputs.
Relying on a calibration to Lehman Brothers market data during the years
of financial crisis which led to its bankruptcy, the Authors found that when the
discount rate is deterministic the survival probabilities can be recovered in a
model-independent way. They found a negligible relevance of the barrier level set
at inception. Instead, crucial role in matching market CDS quotes was played
by volatility, particularly for shortest maturities. The reason resides in the fact
that pure diffusion models like the GBM would never generate defaults in the
short-run (i.e. by touching the lower barrier) without assuming a very high level
of volatility. The necessity to overstress volatility represents a severe drawback of
modelling deterministic barriers. Moreover such a choice is arguable in the light
of uncertainty upon the balance sheet, since the company might have hidden
information within its accounting practices.
To overcome these drawbacks the same Authors introduced the Scenario
Barrier Time-Varying Volatility (SBTV) model, in which the deterministic
default barrier is replaced by a random variable determining different scenarios
for the level of the default trigger. The assignment of a random state variable
on the barrier level4 aims at handling the uncertainty to collect all relevant
3 This in turn can depend on the capital structure of the company, the level of outstanding
debt and on the provision of safety covenants.
4 In the cited paper the random variable can determine just 2 scenarios. The Authors argue
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information for default modelling. In this framework, the much higher flexibility
deriving from the possibility to vary both the barrier level given a certain scenario
and the probability of occurrence of scenarios themselves, avoids the necessity
to overstress the volatility parameters. They show how, in order to replicate
different levels of quoted market CDS spreads, volatility does not need to vary
as much as within the AT1P model. To sum up, the SBTV model provides more
credible results from an economic point of view since it allows to recover a more
stable term structure of volatilities and helps to overcome the problem of zero
short-term credit spreads which affects the original formulation of the Black and
Cox model.
A structural modelling of defaults applied to Counterparty Credit Risk can be
found in the very technical work of Lipton and Savescu (2013), who investigated
the case of CDS contracts affected by default risk. Considering the bilateral
CCR embedded in a CDS contract led the Authors to build a three-dimensional
extended structural model in order to compute the joint survival probabilities of
the three defaultable entities involved in the deal (i.e. the protection buyer, the
protection seller and the reference name). The Authors show a methodology to
consistently compute survival probabilities and CVA/DVAs semi analytically
by solving the pricing problem implied in the Green Function and making use
of the Eigenvalues Expansion Method or the Method of Images, alternatively.
The simplified jump-free version of model, might be used as a good benchmark
for the more general jump diffusion case. For each firm, the Authors modelled
their own relative distance from default barrier as stochastic processes described
by correlated Brownian Motions. They confirm how neglecting jumps denotes
the impossibility of obtaining a good fit of the short-term credit spread curve.
They point out that the 3D extension of the structural model aimed at taking
into account bilateral CCR, is crucial to recover the symmetry in the pricing
problem, meaning that the buyer and seller can agree upon the trading price. By
incorporating a set of indices of pairwise correlation, the Authors demonstrate
that valuation adjustments for typical CDS contracts may be very large.
The contribution of Ballotta and Fusai (2015) is grounded in the use of a
Le`vy process within a Merton-type default setting. They have investigated the
impact of wrong and right-way risks through a multivariate factor model in
which they decompose the risk drivers into idiosyncratic and systemic parts.
After conditioning to the trajectory of the systemic risk factor, they compute
exposures by means of the Fourier Cosine Expansion (COS) method and analyse
the case of a Forward contract written on Brent crude oil. Their findings show
the existence of an asymmetric impact of wrong and right-way risks on the size of
CVA and DVA. Furthermore, in order to implement the consultation guidelines
provided by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) which suggest
to take into account the volatility of CCR metrics, they build a a 95th-percentile
confidence interval for CVAs. In their following work, Ballotta et al. (2015)
while adopting the same multivariate pure jump Le`vy model as underlying
that the inclusion of additional possible scenarios does not increase significantly the quality of
the calibration.
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source of risk, rely on a Black and Cox-type modelling of defaults. The Authors
show how to calibrate the model-implied survival probabilities to market CDS
quotes trough an efficient numerical algorithm based on the Hilbert Transform
Method. Moreover, they extend their previous work by considering both single
and bilateral collateralization, showing that in such a case the complexity of
the pricing problem increases considerably, since it embodies the evaluation of
a package of Calendar Spread Option-type derivatives. Focusing on a Swap
contract written on Brent crude oil, they demonstrate that by using the cited
multivariate Le`vy model and applying state-of-the-art numerical techniques,
even a structural model may represent a robust tool to fit short-term default
probabilities. In the last part of the paper, they analyse the effects of Netting as
a contractual provision to mitigate potential exposures and how the benefits of
Netting interact with the structure of statistical dependences. Since the Netting
case implies a Basket Option pricing problem, the Authors address the analysis
by means of a comparison in terms of efficiency between Convolution and the
Barakat Approximation.
Regardless the default modelling approach, a relevant topic which I consider
worthy to be discussed attains to the structure of default dependences. A higher
degree of detail is required in order to effectively introduce CCR modelling in
presence of default dependences. A detailed treatment of structural default
dynamics instead, represents the core of the present Chapter.
Default dependences as well as the correlation between market and credit
risks originate the so called wrong-way risk and right-way risk. These affect
significantly the picture across several asset classes. As it will be shown, in some
cases wrong-way risk might exacerbate what is knows as gap risk, namely the
occurrence of exposure jumps at default. In those cases, the derivative value
upon the counterpart default would deviate significantly from that observed at
the last collateral margining date. The existence of wrong-way risk and gap risk
could make even full continuous collateralization schemes largely ineffective. As
a consequence, material CVA risk would remain alive. Otherwise, as explained
in Brigo et al. (2014), if exposure does not jump at the first-to-default event,
continuous collateralization schemes perfectly mitigate CCR risk. Ensuring from
wrong-way risk requires the independence hypothesis, in other words the default
of economic agents are conditionally independent with respect to the reference
market filtration. Unfortunately this is not the case for products such as Credit
Default Swaps (CDS), whose value depends on the embedded stream of default
and survival probabilities. As a consequence, if the default of the CDS reference
entity is somehow correlated with that of the protection seller, the pre-default
and on-default survival probability of the reference entity do not match any more.
In such scenario even continuous collateralization schemes would be unable to
fully eliminate counterparty credit risk. The Authors remark that this holds
true for credit products such as CDS but not for others, for instance Interest
Rate Swaps (IRS). In the IRS case in fact, continuously margining of collateral
fully eliminates the CCR.
In their work, the Authors use a reduced-form credit model, in which the
stochastic intensities of the counterparts involved in the transaction as well as
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the one of the CDS reference entity are defined as:
λit = y
i
t + ψ
i
t, i ∈ {B,C,E} (1.1)
where λi are the default intensities of the bank B, the counterpart C and
the reference entity E, respectively. ψi are deterministic non negative shifts and
yi are driven by Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) square-root diffusion processes:
dyit = κ
i(µi − yit)dt+ νi
√
yitdW
i
t , i ∈ {B,C,E} (1.2)
In order to simplify the parametrization and focus on default correlation
rather than spread correlation, the three independent Brownian Motions W i
are assumed to be independent under the risk-neutral measure. As I will refer
in the following, the Authors correlate default processes by means of a Copula
structure. In fact, they adopt a classical doubly stochastic Cox setting:
τi = (Λ
i)−1(ξi) i ∈ {B,C,E}
where the cumulate intensity ξi up to default time τi, defined as Λ
i(τ) =∫ τ
0
λsds, is a standard exponential random variable. In other words, ξi represents
a transformation of firm i default time τi. They than impose a trivariate
Gaussian Copula function CR(uB , uE , uC) ≡ Q{UB < uB , UE < uE , UC < uC}
on the uniform random variables Ui ≡ 1 − exp {−ξi} associated to the firms
cumulated intensities ξi. The Gaussian Copula is parametrized via a correlation
matrix R. By denoting ΦtCIR,i(x) the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the cumulated shifted CIR process Λi(t) evaluated at x and setting Υ(z) ≡
− log (1− Φ(z)) they obtain the copula model:
CR(uB , uE , uC) = EφR [ΦCIR,B(Υ(uB))ΦCIR,E(Υ(uE))ΦCIR,C(Υ(uC))]
where φR denotes the density of the standard Gaussian vector (ZB , ZC , ZE) and
R is the correlation matrix.
In numerical part of their work, Brigo et al. (2014) calculate the CCR valua-
tion adjustments on a 5y-CDS contract traded by two defaultable parties. They
analyse three different credit risk levels (low, mid, high) and three scenarios for
what concerns collateral: quarterly margining frequency, continuous margining
or no collateralization at all. The analysis embraces both the cases of allowance
and prohibition of rehypotecation. In the paper it is showed that, if the CDS
protection buyer is largely in the money, its CVA component is expected to be
relevant in all cases except that of zero default correlation, in which continuous
collateralization is effective in mitigating CCR risk. On the contrary, as the
correlation between the counterpart and the reference entity defaults increases,
neither of them likely to go bankruptcy alone. The joint default of these two
firms would cause a jump in bank exposure. That is the reason why continuous
collateralization might be almost ineffective. The Authors shows that, as defaults
dependence grows, the CVA under continuous collateral margining is similar in
magnitude to that of the uncollaterized case. It takes place an instantaneous
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contagion effect which would drive the default probability of the survived entities
jumping as the first credit event occurs. As default dependence increases, the
term structure of on-default and pre-default survival probabilities diverge signif-
icantly. Such a potential instantaneous growth of the CDS value, jumping at
default, would make it significantly higher than its value in correspondence of the
last collateral margining date. That explains the root of collateral ineffectiveness
under correlated defaults. The Authors conclude that in some cases the contagion
is so relevant to modify CVA and DVA patterns, a distinctive feature of Copula
frameworks to bear in mind when modelling default dependences. Nevertheless,
Copula models are convenient in terms of easiness of simulation and capability
to disentangle dependences blocks. CCR adjustments exhibit to be monotonic
in correlation, which is responsible of a contagion effect invalidating the efficacy
even of full collateralization. Acknowledging the existence of gap risk is the
reason which led regulators, as it will be discussed, to introduce the additional
layer of collateralization represented by Initial Margins.
Also in Brigo et al. (2018) joint stochasticity is assumed in order to introduce
a structure of dependences between interest rates and credit dynamics in the
case of estimating CCR adjustments for Interest Rate Swaps (IRS). The interest
rate sector is modelled according to the Gaussian Shifted Two-factors short-
rate process (G2++), while default intensities are modelled via the Shifted
Square-root Diffusion CIR process in line with Brigo and Chourdakis (2009).
More in details, the instantaneous short-rate process under the risk-neutral
measure is given by:
rt = xt + zt + ϕ(t, α), r(0) = r0 (1.3)
where x and z are Ft-adapted processes which satisfy:
dxt = −axtdt+ σdW 1t , x(0) = x0
dzt = −bztdt+ ηdW 2t , z(0) = z0
(1.4)
(W1,W2) is a correlated two-dimensional Brownian Motion such that:
d〈W1,W2〉t = ρ1,2dt, −1 ≤ ρ1,2 ≤ 1
They denote by α = [r0, a, b, σ, η, ρ1,2] the vector of positive parameters entering
in ϕ. Interest rate models parameters are calibrated to market-observed zero
coupon curves and swaptions volatilities.
As the credit part is concerned, the default dynamics of the two firms are
modelled in a equivalently to the previously discussed article, i.e. according to
equations 1.1 and 1.2. As a difference, Brigo et al. (2018) deal with wrong-way
risk by means of diffusive correlation between interest rate factors x and z and
intensity processes yi, i ∈ {B,C}, so that instantaneous correlation is given by:
d〈Wj ,Wi〉t = ρi,jdt, j ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {B,C}
In order to reduce the number of parameters, the Authors set homogeneous
correlations when modelling the dependences between short-rate factors and
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default intensities, such that interest rates/credit-spreads correlations are:
ρ1,i = ρ2,i ≡ ρ¯i, i ∈ {B,C} (1.5)
As the previously discussed paper, the Authors prefer to model default corre-
lation rather than spread correlation. In fact, a Gaussian Copula on default
times is preferred to correlating default intensities. By applying some required
transformations to random default times, they simulate the correlated survival
indicators by sampling them from a bivariate standard normal distribution:
1{τ i>t} = 1{Ui>exp {Λi(t)}}, U i ≡ Φ(zi), i ∈ {B,C}, (zB , zC) ∼ N2(ρG)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and N2(ρG) is
a bivariate standard normal distribution with correlation parameter ρG.
In the numerical part of the paper, Brigo et al. (2018) investigate the bilateral
CCR valuation adjustments as a function the time between two consecutive
collateral updates. Margining frequency is allowed to vary between one week up
to six months. They consider both the cases of allowance rather than prohibition
of rehypotecation. The Authors consider a 10-years IRS with payment frequency
of one year for the fixed leg and of six months for the floating leg indexed to
EURIBOR rates. They estimate BCCVA sensitivities with respect to collateral
margining frequency. The calculation confirms that in the case of rehypotecation,
CCR adjustments are exacerbated as a consequence of unsecured collateral
posting. Surprisingly, under rehypotecaton the expected exposure might exceed
the uncollateralized case. A remarkable contribution regards the analysis of
the relation between margining frequency and the previously described credit
spread/interest rate and default times correlations. The Authors found a positive
impact in BCCVA of payer IRS deriving from correlating credit spreads and
interest rates in the case. Interestingly, the effect of varying credit spread
volatilities is smaller compared that due to credit spread and interest rates
correlations. The impact of credit spread volatility on bilateral CCR adjustments
seems be reversed according to the sign of correlation.
In Brigo and Pallavicini (2008) a similar setting is adopted in order to evaluate
Counterparty Credit Risk for a plethora of interest rates derivatives, such as
IRS, IRS portfolios, European and Bermudan Swaptions, Constant Maturity
Swap (CMS) Spread Options and Contingent Credit Default Swaps (CCDS).
In the paper they point out that, although CDS volatilities are not so liquid,
they are typically higher compared to those obtainable by the CIR++ model.
In order to match historical series of market CDS volatilities a solution might
be the inclusion jumps. These would increase the volatility generated by the
CIR++ model. For this reason, they make use of exponential jumps in order
to build the JCIR++ model which they use for modelling the default intensity
sector:
dyt = κ(µ− yt)dt+ ν√ytdWt + dJt(ζ1, ζ2) (1.6)
where the jump part Jt(ζ1, ζ2) is defined as:
Jt(ζ1, ζ2) ≡
Mt(ζ1)∑
i=1
Xi(ζ2) (1.7)
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where M is a time-homogeneous Poisson process with intensity ζ1, independent
form W while X is exponentially distributed random variable with positive finite
mean ζ2, independent from M and W . The Authors decide to calibrate the
diffusive part of the JCIR++ model to market CDS quotes and assume levels
for the parameters ζ1 and ζ2 able reproduce realistic scenarios for CDS curves.
In the numerical part of the work, Brigo and Pallavicini (2008) compute the
payoff of several interest rates derivatives via joint Monte Carlo simulations
of the stochastic factors x, z and y (see above). Among other payoffs, the
Authors focus also on Contingent Credit Default Swaps (CCDS), which are
contract paying upon the default of a reference entity the loss given default
of a predetermined portfolio, if positive. Pricing the default leg of a CCDS
issued on a given portfolio Π is equivalent to estimating the unilateral CVA
of that portfolio. In literature, the mathematical shape of CCDS has made
them to be considered elective instruments to hedge Counterparty Credit Risk.
The Authors have found that the unilateral CVA decreases with correlation for
receiver payoffs (IRS, IRS portfolios, European and Bermudan Swaptions) since,
if default intensities increase, in presence of positive correlation the underlying
interest rates increase making the mark-to-market of receiver contracts, upon
which exposures at default are computed, being less likely in the money. On
the other side, the CCR adjustment for payer payoffs increases with correlation.
They conclude by arguing that the impact of CCR adjustments is relevant across
many interest rate products they have analysed and that correlation patterns
are relevant in turn. Nevertheless, they distinguish between the cases of low
and high CDS implied default probabilities. In fact, when market implied PD
are high, their contribution is predominant and the effect of other fine details
is wiped out. On the contrary, when CDS implied PD are not extremely high,
fine details such as the fine structure of factor dynamics and correlations in
particular are more important.
A early work on Counterparty Credit Risk valuation applied to energy
commodity trades in presence of correlation between market and credit risks is
the one of Brigo and Bakkar (2009). The Authors focus on oil but much of their
reasoning can be adapted to other commodities with similar characteristics in
terms of storability, liquidity and seasonality. In their analysis of default-risky
Forward and Swap contracts traded between an airline company and a very high
credit quality bank, they exploit a reduced-form approach in the presence of
correlation between credit spreads and the underlying commodity in order to
quantify the unilateral CVA. The Authors firstly interpret the impact of CCR
as the difference between Futures and Forward prices, since the firsts unlike
the seconds, are subjected to margining procedures. They adopt the CIR++
framework for modelling stochastic hazard rates as in 1.2 and the Smith-Schwartz
model for describing the dynamics of the underlying oil spot log price5:
lnSt = xt + Lt + ϕt (1.8)
5 The existence itself of oil spot prices an assumption since they are not quoted on the
market.
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where under the risk-neutral measure:
dxt = −kxxtdt+ σxdW xt
dLt = −µLdt+ σLdWLt , d〈W x,WL〉t = ρx,Ldt
(1.9)
where ϕ is a deterministic shift used to calibrate oil futures quotes, x represent
the short-run deviation whereas L is the backbone to the equilibrium price level
in the long run. The dependence between market and credit risks is set as:
d〈Wx,Wy〉t = ρx,ydt, d〈WL,Wy〉t = ρL,ydt
In the light of the difficulties one incurs when trying to perform historical
estimations of market correlations, they prefer to set ρx,y = ρL,y = ρ¯.
Within their case study involving a defaultable airline company and an high
credit quality bank, the Authors suppose that the airline is entering into the trade
for risk management purposes. The Authors isolates the receiver case (right-way
risk) from the payer case (wrong-way risk) and underline the prominent role of
both correlation and volatilities. The adjustment they found ranges between
roughly 1.5% and 6% depending on volatility and correlation levels. In the
concluding remarks, they argue that the effective quantification of CCR cannot
be carried out by predetermines multipliers, as it had been done in previous
years.
1.1.2 Main contributions
The present work differs from Ballotta et al. (2015) by focusing on the equity
rather then on the firm value, since the former has the appealing feature of being
a tradable asset whose market value is observable. Another relevant contribution
of the present Chapter pertains to the theoretical side. By applying some asset
pricing principles, a general formula for the pricing of bilateral CCR Adjustments
(i.e CVA and DVA) is derived. The solution is model-independent, in the sense
it applies both to structural or reduced-form default modelling. Moreover, in
my analysis no particular setting for the replication strategy is needed.
A numerical application has been performed in order to compute the price
correction for Counterparty Credit Risk. In this work it has been applied the
Fourier Cosine Series (COS) method introduced by Fang and Oosterlee (2008)
since, as it was showed in the computational finance literature, it is more efficient
compared to other Fourier-based methods such as the FFT (see Carr and Madan
(1999)) or the CONV Method, see Lord et al. (2008). Both baseline single-
sided and double-sided energy commodities contingent claims are taken into
account. From the computational point of view, my contribution is to implement
a hybrid numerical procedure which relies on the COS method for calibrating
the relevant parameters sets including barriers and for computing Exposures-
at-Defaults (EAD). A joint Monte Carlo simulation is used to experimentally
address the dependence between the two firms implied by the so-called first-to-
default problem. Furthermore, I extend the COS formula to Forwards and later
to Swaps, interpreted as portfolio of Forwards with different maturities.
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The Chapter is organized as follows: in Section 1.2 it is described the technical
setup required for the analysis. In Section 1.3 I straightforwardly derive a model-
independent additive formula for BVA pricing which does not require any specific
assumptions about the hedging strategy. In Section 1.4 after the introduction of
Fourier pricing, calibration results and absolute as well as relative sizes of the
CVA/DVA metrics are discussed. Section 1.5 draws some concluding remarks.
1.2 Model setup
In a bilateral CCR perspective, let me introduce two defaultable parties involved
in a OTC derivative deal6 denoted by the investment bank B (the dealer) and
its client C (which might be a corporate firm or another bank).
The market is modelled through a filtered probability space (Ω,Q,Gt) where
Ω is the set of possible events, Q is some risk-neutral martingale measure and
the global filtration is defined as Gt ≡ Ft ∨Ht7.
{Ft}0≤t≤T is the reference filtration which contains all market information
except of credit events up to time t while {Ht}0≤t≤T is the σ(τ ∧ t)-algebra
generated by the default processes. τ is the first-to-default random time defined
as τ ≡ τB ∧ τC . It is noted that τ is a G-stopping time and the above filtrations
satisfy the usual conditions of completeness and right-continuity.
An infinitely divisible Le`vy process {Xt}0≤t≤T defined on the filtered proba-
bility space (Ω,Q,Gt) is a stochastic process with stationary and independent
increments, whose distribution allows for non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis8.
For the class of Le`vy processes, it is often impossible to determine the PDF
analytically.
6 Typically counterparts trade a portfolio of deals, so that the eventual contractual provision
of some Netting scheme would definitely mitigate the aggregate CCR risk of the portfolio.
7 Actually, as well explained by Brigo et al. (2013) in Chapter 3, in the context of structural
models, F and G coincide by construction since default processes are completely driven by
default-free market information.
8 Higher then second order moments describe the deviation from a Gaussian setting.
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Nevertheless, their characteristic function is always available in closed form
thanks to the well-known Le`vy-Khintchine representation:
φX(u; t) = E[eıuXt ] = etϕX(u), u ∈ R (1.10)
where ϕX(u) is called characteristic exponent of parameter u with the process
{Xt}t≥09.
The Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG) process introduced by Barndorff-Nielsen
(1997) is a pure jump Le`vy process which can be obtained by subordinating
a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) to an independent Inverse Gaussian
(IV) process IG(t). The Inverse Gaussian process, alternatively known as the
distributional law of first-passage time of the Brownian Motion, is a α-stable
subordinator with α = 12 .
The NIG process, similarly to other ones which are obtainable by subordina-
tion, is said to be a time-changed Le`vy process: in other words, it is indexed to
a ”stochastic clock”. Hence the NIG Process presents the following form:
Xt = µIGt + σWIGt (1.12)
Building Le`vy processes by brownian subordination is particularly appealing
from an economic point of view since the time-change might be interpreted as
the switch from calendar time to business time. This implies to assume that
asset prices are mainly driven by the relevant news, characterized by random
arrival times and random impact on the market. Indeed, empirical evidence
suggests that gaussianity seems to be recovered under such trading time. The
characteristic exponent in the case of NIG process is:
ϕX(u) =
1−√1− 2ıθκ+ u2σ2κ
κ
(1.13)
where u is the Fourier parameter, ı is the imaginary unit. As for the meaning
of parameters is concerned, θ ∈ R describes the sign of the skewness of the
distribution, σ > 0 is the volatility parameter and κ > 0 controls the excess
kurtosis of the distribution. Moreover, non Gaussian Le`vy processes have
been largely applied in financial modelling because of their superior capability
compared to that of pure diffusion models to represent the stylized behaviour
observed in real markets. More specifically, Le`vy processes can replicate implied
volatility surfaces without overstress model parameters and can accommodate
9 In coherence with the pioneering contribution of Black and Scholes (1973), within the
family of Le`vy processes the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) has been the most celebrated
by both academic researchers and industrial practitioners. The characteristic exponent which
uniquely defines the GBM is:
ϕX(u) = −u
2σ2
2
(1.11)
where σ is the volatility parameter. Nevertheless, empirical evidence has shown that asset
returns (i.e. log prices) are rarely described by a Gaussian distribution.
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for jumps, see Cont and Tankov (2004). The presence of jumps in the path of
risky assets implies that the market is in general incomplete10.
In this framework the NIG process Xt is the relevant risk driver for the
uncertain dynamics of the underlying asset St, whose price at time t under the
risk neutral measure Q is:
St = S0e
(r−q−ϕX(−i))t+Xt (1.14)
where r > 0 is the proxy for the risk-free rate (e.g. EURIBOR/EONIA)
and q > 0 is the continuous dividend yield paid by the underlying stock. µ =
r−q−ϕX(−i) is the mean-correcting drift needed to allow St to be an exponential
martingale.
In figure 1.1 it is shown a simulated five years weekly path of equation 1.14,
where I remind Xt is a NIG:
Fig. 1.1: Example of a five years weekly simulated path for a NIG process.
Coherently with the work of Ballotta and Fusai (2015), I further assume that
the risk driver Xt can be disentangled as follows:
Xt = Yt + aZt (1.15)
where Yt is a Le`vy process describing the idiosyncratic part or the risk, Zt
is an independent Le`vy process describing the systemic risk component and a
is the regression coefficient relative to the systemic risk. This setup is robust
from the economic perspective and allows, after conditioning to the path of the
10 Market incompleteness means that it is not possible to replicate every uncertain derivative
payoff in the market through a combination of elementary assets: hence, so that derivative
claims are not redundant.
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systemic risk factor Zt, to describe the full structure of dependence between the
two firms i and j simply through the index of linear pairwise correlation11:
ρij = aiaj
Var[Z(1)]√
Var[Xi(1)]Var[Xj(1)]
Within my structural approach the random default time τ is modelled a la`
Black and Cox (1976), i.e. as the first-passage time of the firm’s equity at the
level of a fixed default trigger barrier:
τi = inf{t ∈ (0, T ] : Sit ≤ Ki}, i ∈ {B,C} (1.16)
I assume that equation 1.14 describes also the dynamics of equity values of
firms B and C in addition to those of the underlying assets. Then, replacing it
in equation 1.16 it leads to:
τi = inf{t ∈ (0, T ] : Si0e(r−q
i−ϕXi (−i))t+Xi(t) ≤ Ki} (1.17)
= inf{t ∈ (0, T ] : Xit ≤ log
(
Ki
Si0
)
− (r − qi − ϕXi(−i))t}
= inf
{
t ∈ (0, T ] : Zit ≤
log
(
Ki
Si0
)
− (r − qi − ϕXi(−i))t− Yt
ai
}
The last two rearrangements highlight how, by disentangling the systemic
and the idiosyncratic components of the risk, the barriers triggering credit events
can be configured both as time-dependent and stochastic. Nevertheless, as I will
explain later in details, setting a fixed barrier as denoted by equation 1.17 is
convenient in terms of mathematical tractability12.
1.3 Bilateral Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) pricing
In this Section, I derive a representation of CCR risk metrics via a straightforward
and model-independent framework. The result applies to both structural and
reduced-form default modelling approaches. No assumption for the hedging
of the jump-to-default risks is required. Furthermore, I provide an intuitive
economic interpretation of such metrics which configure as quite complex exotic
derivatives.
In presence of Counterparty Credit Risk it is needed to distinguish between
V (t, S), which denotes the price at time t of the default-free derivative contract
and Vˆ (t, S,DB , DC), which denotes the price of the equivalent default-risky
contingent claim. The state processes {Dit}0≤t≤T indicate the occurrence of the
respective credit events:
Dit ≡ 1{τi≤t}, i ∈ {B,C}
11 The structure of dependences which lead to wrong and right-way risk in the context of
structural Le`vy models, has already been exhaustively investigated in previous literature.
12 Simulating the stochastic case is destined to future research.
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In the case of no default, at maturity time T the buyer will receive or make
the contractual payment correspondent to the derivative payoff Φˆ(ST ). The
dealer will observe an opposite cash flow −Φˆ(ST ).
According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
2002 Master Agreement upon default the surviving party, in the case of being
out of the money, is obliged to pay all its debt. Conversely, in the case of being
in the money, the surviving party can claim just a recovery fraction of her credit.
PROPOSITION 1. Let me assume that the computation is based on the risk-
free close-out, i.e. the Exposure at Default (EAD) denoted by ετ , equals to the
mark-to-market of the default-free contract. In compliance with ISDA (2002) the
following border conditions hold at the stopping times τC and τB:
VˆτC = RC(ε
+
τC )− ε−τC
VˆτB = ε
+
τB −RB(ε−τB )
(1.18)
then according to the Asset Pricing Theorem (APT), the price at time t of a
counterparty-risky derivative claim Vˆ is:
Vˆt = Vt−EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)(ε+τC −RC(ε+τC ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CV A
+EQt [1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)(ε
−
τC −RB(ε−τB ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DVA
(1.19)
where Vt is the default-free value of the contract, D is the risk-free discount
factor13 and RC and RB are respectively the client and the bank’s recovery
functions upon respective defaults.
Proof. According to the APT the risk-neutral price of an asset is equal to
the expected value of its discounted future payoff under some suitable pricing
measure Q.
In the case of a counterparty-risky derivative it is necessary to distinguish
among possible scenarios of default or no default:
Vˆt = EQt [1{τ>T}D(t, T )VˆT +1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC +1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ] (1.20)
where 1A denotes the indicator function of the event A. At expiry T the
economic value of a derivative claim is simply its payoff, i.e. VˆT = Φˆ(ST ). Since
no premature default has occurred, it holds Φˆ(ST ) = Φ(ST ). By substituting
this results in 1.20 I obtain:
Vˆt = EQt [1{τ>T}D(t, T )Φˆ(ST ) + 1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
= EQt [1{τ>T}D(t, T )Φ(ST ) + 1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
= EQt [(1− 1{τ≤T})D(t, T )Φ(ST ) + 1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
= Vt − EQt [1{τ≤T}D(t, T )Φ(ST )] + EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
13 Under the independence hypothesis, the risk-free discount factor can be dragged out
from the expectation and equals to the price of a zero-coupon bond, i.e. D(0, t) =
EQ
[
exp
(
− ∫ t0 rsds)]. r is proxied by the Eonia/EURIBOR rates.
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Applying the Law of Iterated Expectation to the second term of the right-
hand side it is then possible to exploit that the event 1{τ≤T} is G-adapted while
the derivative payoff Φ(ST ) is F-adapted and independent from H it can be
obtained:
Vˆt = Vt−EQt [EQ[1{τ≤T}D(t, T )Φ(ST ) | Gτ ]]
+EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
= Vt−EQt [1{τ≤T}D(t, τ)EQ[D(τ, T )Φ(ST ) | Fτ ]]
+EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
= Vt−EQt [1{τ≤T}D(t, τ)Vτ ]
+EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
= Vt−EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VτC ]
−EQt [1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VτB ] + EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)VˆτC + 1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)VˆτB ]
= Vt−EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)(VτC − VˆτC )]− EQt [1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)(VτB − VˆτB )]
Finally, substituting the ISDA border conditions 1.18 it can be showed:
Vˆt = Vt−EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)(ε+τC−RC(ε+τC ))]+EQt [1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)(ε−τC−RB(ε−τB ))]
The Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) appears to be a call option
with zero strike and random maturity issued on the uncollaterized exposure
and represents the expected loss on banks’ credits due to counterparty default
risk. Conversely, the Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA) appears to be a
put option with zero strike and random maturity issued on the uncollateratized
exposure and represents the expected gain on bank’s debts due to its own default
risk. This explains why many authors argue that Bilateral Counterparty Credit
Risk adds two optionality levels to the derivative payoff.
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1.4 Numerical application of a hybrid Fourier - Monte Carlo
procedure
In Subsection 1.4.1 I first introduce the theoretical setup of the Fourier Cosine
Series (COS) method for European Options and then in Subsection 1.4.2 it
is described its recursive application for pricing single name CDS. While the
first methodology has been used for computing Exposures at Default (EAD),
the second has been required for calibrating the level of the default barriers.
Subsection 1.4.3 provides the results for both calibrations and CCR metrics.
1.4.1 Reviewing the COS method for European Options
The main issue in solving pricing problems grounded on a time-changed Le`vy
process such as the NIG is related to the unknown form of its conditional
probability density function.
The main advantage of Fourier-based methods as pricing tool is related to the
possibility to solve semi-analytically pricing problems within a broader class of
underlying processes, i.e. those for which the characteristic function is known in
closed form. This feature makes Fourier-based pricing often necessary in practical
applications. State-of-the-art numerical integration techniques commonly rely
on a transformation to the Fourier domain. Nevertheless, Fang and Oosterlee
(2008) while introducing the Fourier Cosine Series (COS) method showed that,
among the other Fourier-based pricing methodologies available in literature,
their proposal guarantees higher efficiency, for instance in comparison to the
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) proposed by Carr and Madan (1999) or the
Convolution Method (CONV), see Lord et al. (2008). In fact, quadrature rule
based techniques do not provide the highest efficiency when solving Fourier
transformed integrals since, as the integrands are highly oscillatory, a relatively
fine grid has to be used in order to obtain satisfactory accuracy with the FFT.
As the Authors explain in their work, Fourier Cosine expansions in the context of
numerical integration represent an alternative with respect to methods based on
the FFT. Other highly efficient techniques for pricing plain vanilla options can
be retrieved in the Fast Gauss Transform (see Broadie and Yamamoto (2003))
and in the Double-Exponential Transformation (see Mori and Sugihara (2001)).
The COS method can however handle more general dynamics for the underlying
compared to these methodologies. In the paper of Fang and Oosterlee (2008)
the derivation of the methodology has been accompanied by an error analysis.
In several numerical experiments, the convergence rate of the COS method has
shown to be exponential, while the computational complexity just is linear in
the number of terms chosen in the Fourier Cosine series expansion.
I now introduce the method in detail since it has been applied in its original
formulation for computing EAD and for the underlyings calibration. The recur-
sive COS scheme for CDS, explained in next Subsection, has been applied for
calibrating firms’ parameters sets and the default barriers.
The COS method provides a different approach for computing inverse Fourier
integrals, which consists in recovering the unknown conditional PDF through its
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cosine series expansion. This methodology is well suited for smooth densities (a
propriety which holds for Le`vy processes) defined on a finite support14.
As usual, the starting point is the risk-neutral valuation formula:
v(x, t) = e−r(T−t)EQ[(y, T ) | x] = e−r(T−t)
∫
R
v(y, T )f(y | x)dy (1.21)
where v(y, T ) is the contract-specific payoff function and f(y | x) is the
conditional PDF of the underlying asset. Since in numerical applications would
be pointless to compute an integral over a infinite domain, it is needed to truncate
it to a finite one that properly approximates its infinite counterpart, i.e.:
v(x, t) ' e−r(T−t)
∫ b
a
v(y, T )f(y | x)dy (1.22)
being | a | and | b | large enough. As regards the choice of the truncation interval
is concerned, the Authors suggest:
[a, b] =
[
c1 − L
√
c2 +
√
c4 , c1 + L
√
c2 +
√
c4
]
, L = 10
where ci is the i-th cumulant of YT (y). The next step is to replace the
integrand function with its cosine series expansion and in this regard the reader
might feel useful to be reminded the following result.
Definition 1.4.1 (Fourier Cosine Series). Let f : [a, b] → R, its cosine series
expansion is given by:
f(x) =
∞∑
k=0
′
Ak cos
(
kpi
x− a
b− a
)
(1.23)
with
Ak(x) =
2
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x) cos
(
kpi
x− a
b− a
)
dx (1.24)
where
∑′
indicates that the first term in the summation is halved. In order
to apply this methodology to the derivatives pricing let me denote by Fk and Vk
the k-th coefficients of f(y | x) and v(y, T ), respectively. Applying this result in
1.22 I have:
v(x, t) = e−r(T−t)
∫ b
a
v(y, T )
∞∑
k=0
′
Fk(x) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy
Then, interchanging the integration and summation operators it can be
obtained:
14 The usual Fourier series expansion is actually superior when a function is periodic, see
Fang and Oosterlee (2008).
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v(x, t) = e−r(T−t)
∞∑
k=0
′
∫ b
a
v(y, T ) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
Fk(x)dy (1.25)
Since by definition it holds:
Vk =
2
b− a
∫ b
a
v(y, T ) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy
by replacing this result in equation 1.25 I get:
v(x, t) =
b− a
2
e−r(T−t)
∞∑
k=0
′
VkFk(x)
In the light of the rapid decay of Fourier coefficients, it is possible to truncate
the series to the first N terms (N is typically set as some power of 2):
v(x, t) =
b− a
2
e−r(T−t)
N−1∑
k=0
′
VkFk(x)
Fk coefficients. As regards the computation of Fk coefficients of the
conditional PDF, the idea is to approximate the finite integral in equation 1.24
through its infinite counterpart:
Fk(x) =
2
b− a
∫ b
a
f(y | x) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy
'F˜k(x)
=
2
b− a
∫
R
f(y | x) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy
=
2
b− a<
{∫
R
f(y | x)
[
cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
+ i sin
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)]
dy
}
=
2
b− a<
{∫
R
f(y | x)eikpi y−ab−a dy
}
By the Euler’s formula I have:
Fk(x) =
2
b− a<
{
e−
ikpia
b−a
∫
R
f(y | x)ei kpib−aydy
}
=
2
b− a<
{
e−
ikpia
b−a φy|x
(
kpi
b− a
)}
where φy|x (u) is the characteristic function of parameter u of the model
being used, which is obtainable in closed form. Focusing on log-strike prices, by
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some simple passages:
x ≡ log
(
S0
K
)
and y ≡ log
(
ST
K
)
.
φy|x (u) =E
[
eiuy
]
=E
[
e
iu log
(
ST
K
)]
=E
[
e
iu log
(
S0e
µT+XT
K
)]
=E
[
eiu(x+µT+XT )
]
=eiu(x+µT )E
[
eiuXT
]
=eiu(x+µT )φXNIGT (u, T )
Therefore, the characteristic function of the variable y | x as defined above is
easily recoverable from the one of the NIG process. Being all the elements well
specified, the pricing rule reads:
v(x, t) = e−r(T−t)
N−1∑
k=0
′<
{
e−
ikpia
b−a φy|x
(
kpi
b− a, T
)}
Vk (1.26)
Equation 1.26 represents the general pricing formula under the COS method.
Finally, when evaluating a specific derivative claim it is necessary to compute
its Vk coefficients.
Vk coefficients. The payoff at maturity of European-style options in log-
strike prices, which in my model is required for the calculation of the exposures
relevant for CVA and DVA, is:
v(y, T ) = [αK(ey − 1)+] with α =
{
1, for a Call
−1, for a Put
Following Fang and Oosterlee (2008), let me define the following functions:
χk(c, d) ≡
∫ d
c
ey cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy (1.27)
and
ψk(c, d) ≡
∫ d
c
cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy (1.28)
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Above integrals can be solved analytically by basic calculus15. Their solutions
are:
χk(c, d) =
1
1 +
(
kpi
b−a
)2 [cos(kpid− ab− a
)
ed − cos
(
kpi
c− a
b− a
)
ec
]
+
1
1 +
(
kpi
b−a
)2 kpib− a
[
sin
(
kpi
d− a
b− a
)
ed − sin
(
kpi
c− a
b− a
)
ec
] (1.29)
and
ψk(c, d) =
{[
sin
(
kpi d−ab−a
)
− sin
(
kpi c−ab−a
)]
b−a
kpi k 6= 0
(d− c) k = 0
(1.30)
In the case of a European-style Call option, it can be obtained:
V callk =
2
b− a
∫ b
0
K(ey − 1) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy =
2
b− aK(χk(0, b)− ψk(0, b))
(1.31)
Similarly, for a vanilla Put option I have:
V putk =
2
b− a
∫ 0
a
K(1− ey) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy =
2
b− aK(−χk(a, 0) + ψk(a, 0))
(1.32)
1.4.2 Extending the COS pricing formula to Forward and Swap contracts
I argue that the COS formula for Call (Put) european options is immediately
extensible to the pricing of a long (short) positions Forward trades by simply
considering the whole integration interval [a, b]. The Fourier coefficients V Fwdk of
a long position on a Forward are:
V Fwdk =
2
b− a
∫ b
a
K(ey − 1) cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
dy =
2
b− aK(χk(a, b)− ψk(a, b))
(1.33)
Furthermore, by interpreting Swap contracts as portfolios composed by
Forwards of different maturities makes straightforward their fair evaluation
15 χ is obtained by integrating by parts twice. The integral for ψ is immediate.
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through the COS method. The following formula provides the COS-computed
value of a payer Swap contract with M payment dates:
v(x, t)Swap =
M∑
m=1
e−r(Tm−t)(Tm+1−Tm)
N−1∑
k=0
′<
{
e−
ikpia
b−a φy|x
(
kpi
b− a, tm
)}
V Fwdk
(1.34)
Figures 1.2 to 1.4 show the Exposures at Default (EAD) profiles over time
computed by the COS method for long positions in analysed derivatives contracts.
In the case of a Swap contract, the exposure profile over time presents a reverse
U-shape, since it reaches its maximum around the 18th monitoring date and then
it lowers as a consequence of the progressive decreasing number of remaining
payments.
Fig. 1.2: Exposure at Default (EAD) over time for a European Call Option issued on
crude oil computed by the COS formula. Weekly default monitoring dates
are assumed (M = 48) within a time horizon of 1 year.
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Fig. 1.3: Exposure at Default (EAD) over time for a Forward issued on crude oil
computed by the COS formula. Weekly default monitoring dates are assumed
(M = 48) within a time horizon of 1 year.
Fig. 1.4: Exposure at default over time (EAD) for a Swap issued on crude oil computed
by the COS formula. Weekly default monitoring dates are assumed (M = 48)
within a time horizon of 1 year.
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1.4.3 Reviewing the COS method for CDS contracts
In order to simulate default processes within a structural approach, both credit
drivers parameters and barriers levels have to be properly tuned. Fine tuning
implies the possibility to reproduce survival and default probabilities coherently
with the information available in the market. It is reasonable to believe that
there is implicit information on creditworthiness in single name CDS contracts,
since they basically provide to the buyer protection against the default of some
reference entity. In these regards, the model parameters and the barrier levels
will be retrieved in order to fit market-implied survival default probabilities and
then reproduce the market structure of CDS spreads.
As described in equation 1.16, within a structural first-passage time modelling
of default processes, the ”credit event” is defined as:
τ ≡ inf{t ∈ (0, T ] : St ≤ K}
where K is a fraction of the firm value for the shareholders side at inception.
Focusing on Yt ≡ log
(
St
S0
)
, the risk-neutral survival probability at time t
Q{τ > t} satisfies:
Q{τ > t} =Q
{
Ys > log
(
K
S0
)
, for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
=Q
{
min
0≤s≤t
Ys > log
(
K
S0
)}
=EQ
[
1
{
min
0≤s≤t
Ys > log
(
K
S0
)}] (1.35)
Equation 1.35 corresponds to the price of an Binary Down-and-Out Barrier
Option (BDOB) without discounting.
Let me define the reference value for the bankruptcy as RV = log
(
K
S0
)
and suppose that, in the time interval (0, T ], there is a finite number of default
monitoring dates identified in the grid T ≡ {T0, T1, T2, ..., TM}, with Tm =
m∆T (m = 0, 1, ...,M) and ∆T = T/M , such that:
Q{τ > T} = EQ
[
1{YT1∈[RV,∞]}1{YT2∈[RV,∞]}...1{YTM∈[RV,∞]}
]
(1.36)
Equation 1.36 coincides with the pricing formula for Discrete Digital Options
without discounting. This can be re-written in recursive form by exploiting the
Markov propriety:
Q{τ > T} =
∫ ∞
RV
...
∫ ∞
RV
...
∫ ∞
RV
fYTM |YTM−1 (yTM | yTM−1)dyTM
.fYTm |YTm−1 (yTm | yTm−1)dyTm ...fYT1 |YT0 (yT1 | yT0)dyT1
(1.37)
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By defining:
p(y, TM ) ≡ 1 (1.38)
and letting it correspond to the payoff at maturity of a Virtual Digital Option
without discounting, it is possible to obtain the following recursive relation:
{
p(y, Tm) =
∫∞
RV
fYTm+1|YTm (y | x)p(y, TM+1)dy, m = M − 1, ..., 2, 1, 0
Q{τ > T} = p(y, T0)
(1.39)
The computation of survival probabilities can be performed via a Backward
Induction loop of the COS scheme. Recalling that the Fourier cosine series of
fYTM |YTM−1 (y | x) is:
fYTM |YTM−1 (y | x) =
2
b− a
N∑
k=0
′<
{
e−ikpi
x−a
b−a φy|x
(
kpi
b− a,∆T
)}
cos
(
kpi
y − a
b− a
)
(1.40)
The fair spread at the starting date T0 for a running
16 CDS with maturity
T given the recovery rate R (conventionally fixed at 40% in standard CDS) is
the one which makes equal the premium leg and the protection leg: i.e.:
s =
(1−R) ∫ T
0
e−rsQ{τ > s}ds∫ T
0
e−rsQ{τ ≤ s}ds
(1.41)
As expected, the CDS spread depends on a stream of survival and default
probabilities. By assuming a constant discount rate, exploiting that the survival
probability Q{τ > t} = 1 − Q{τ ≤ t} and integrating by parts, equation 1.41
can be simplified to:
s = (1−R)
(
1− e−rTQ{τ > T}∫ T
0
e−rsQ{τ > s}ds
− r
)
(1.42)
Equation 1.42 can be discretized by applying the Composite Trapezoidal
Rule, such that:
strap = (1−R)
(
1− e−rTQ{τ > T}∑M
j=0 wje
−rTjQ{τ > Tj}∆T
− r
)
(1.43)
with wj =
1
2 for j = 0 and j = M and wj = 1 otherwise.
Hence, equation 1.43 has been used as theoretical fair CDS spread quote for
my calibration purposes.
16 Running means that no upfront is paid at inception.
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1.4.4 Numerical computation of bilateral CCR metrics via Monte Carlo: the
first-to-default problem
Concerning my numerical application, two firms have been chosen: BNP Paribas
as a representative bank, and Enel, as representative corporation. Suppose
that they negotiate OTC derivative claims issued on the most liquid energy
commodity assets quoted in the NYMEX, i.e. crude oil and natural gas.
The underlyings are calibrated to the option prices provided by the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME). Within my numerical analysis, the discount factors
are deterministic and calibrated by using the Hull-White 1 Factor model to the
1-year term structure of EURIBOR rates at various short maturities combined
with the EONIA overnight rates17.
Relying on the availability of data on quoted fair spreads from the iTraxx
Series for the European CDS market, the calibration has been performed through
the minimization of a loss function expressed in terms of Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE) of the fair spread produced by my model, given a vector of
benchmark securities:
[K∗, κ∗, θ∗, σ∗] = arg min
√∑
CDS
(market CDS spread - model CDS spread)2
Number of benchmark CDS
(1.44)
The chosen energy commodity underlyings are supposed to be non defaultable
and calibrated to available option prices provided by the CME. For the purpose
of calibrating the dynamics of the two firms, 5-years CDS quotes have been
considered.
In the case of the recursive COS loop needed for CDS, the Fourier summation
has been truncated to N = 210 terms in order to reach a satisfying level of
accuracy. The truncation has been fixed to N = 28 terms in the case of European
Options issued on crude oil and natural gas.
Calibration results
NIG processes Barrier κ∗ θ∗ σ∗ RMSE
Enel 0.65033 0.23639 -0.20818 0.18073 1.5445
BNP Paribas 0.63839 0.24519 -0.20520 0.23570 1.1972
Crude Oil 0.86128 -0.14939 0.19686 0.5373
Natural Gas 0.87215 -0.13590 0.21107 0.4565
Tab. 1.1: Calibration results based on CDS data for corporates and on Options data
for the underlying energy commodities. RMSEs are measured in basis points.
Nevertheless as shown by Table 1.1, the recursive application of the COS
approximation scheme required in the case of CDS contracts provides a larger
17 Source: https://www.emmi-benchmarks.eu/euribor-eonia-org/eonia-rates.html
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RMSE relative calibration compared to those of options. I have found that
the COS algorithm for CDS is very accurate, stable and efficient. In fact the
calibration of each firm parameters set takes on average just 67.5 seconds at
the cited level of accuracy. The algorithm has been coded in Python 2.7 on
a MacBook Pro Retina (Late 2013) with 2,4 GHz Intel Core i5 R© processor
and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM. This is due to the application of an efficient
FFT algorithm to the recursive matrix-vector products, as shown by Fang et al.
(2010). The algorithm displays flexibility as well since, among the set of possible
starting values, it allows me to successfully calibrate around the observed level of
historical market volatility. From a qualitative point of view, the calibration of
both firms returns leptokuric and negatively skewed empirical distributions. Since
Enel and BNP Paribas presented similar CDS spreads, the market-consistent
parameters are similar as well. The only exception is relative to volatilities which
matches quite well the afore mentioned historical average values. As regards
the commodity assets, they also display quite fat left tails and negative skew.
Two examples of simulated distributions relative to Enel and natural gas are
displayed in figure 1.5.
Once the optimal vectors of parameters are recovered through the calibration
procedure, the first-to-default problem and the computation of the CVA and
DVA terms showed in the right-hand side of equation 1.19 can be performed via
Monte Carlo simulation. My setting contemplates 10,000 simulated scenarios.
At this stage it shall be pointed out that, a joint Monte Carlo simulation
of the two default processes is a reasonable choice in order to address the issue
of statistical dependences, since in that instance the destiny of the two firms
is intrinsically related. Indeed, the simulation breaks at the first default (i.e.
whenever one of the two firms touches the down barrier) since, in a bilateral
Counterparty Credit Risk setting, what happens after the first credit event is
negligible. In this respect, my point is that previous works in which defaults are
driven by independent point processes are basically not fully consistent with the
goal to analyse the bilateral CCR.
Counterparty Credit Risk Valuation Adjustments
Contract type V0 CVA CVA/V0 DVA DVA/V0 Vˆ0
ATM Call Oil 5.82103 0.81918 15275.381 0 0 4.93184
Forward Oil -0.31708 0.00695 219.058 0.00393 124.097 -0.32009
Swap Oil -1.37521 0.00031 2.238 0.01566 113.908 -1.35986
ATM Call Gas 0.41155 0.06156 1496.011 0 0 0.34998
Forward Gas -0.02651 0.00010 38.305 0.00045 169.622 -0.02616
Swap Gas -0.06716 0.00063 93.757 0.00061 90.210 -0.06718
Tab. 1.2: CVAs and DVAs for different derivatives claims. Relative valuation adjust-
ments are expressed in basis points. At the money Call Options have been
considered. Both forward and swap rates were set to their respective fair
values.
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Fig. 1.5: Simulated distributions with calibrated parameters for Enel (top) and natural
gas (bottom).
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The above Table 1.2 shows the results for bilateral Counterparty Credit
Risk adjustments computed trough the described hybrid Fourier-Monte Carlo
methodology. Enel is assumed to be the computing counterpart being on the
buyer side in all the transactions. I consider at the money derivative claims, so
that also the Forwards and the Swaps are traded at their fair forward and swap
rates, respectively. In accordance with previous literature, I have found that in
the Monte Carlo simulation the volatility is the key player in determining credit
events. Even if in my dataset the CDS spreads of BNP Paribas are slightly
lower if compared to the ones of Enel (this evidence is reflected by the slightly
higher level of the calibrated barrier for the corporation), since my calibration
replicates the higher historical volatility registered for BNP, that financial firm is
more likely to default first. This is amplified by the first-to-default setting, since
even in simulations in which Enel is going to bankruptcy, BNP often defaults
first. As previously stated, a potential late credit event of the corporate firm is
basically not relevant. In order to reproduce this feature, as already mentioned,
the simulation breaks at the first default. According to my results, the empirical
first-to-default probabilities are stable roughly around 7%/8% for Enel and at
20%/22% for BNP Paribas.
As expected, I found that the CVA is considerably higher for one-sided
payoff derivatives such as hypothetical European Call options negotiated over
the counter18. In these cases the DVA is null, since the buyer is never going to be
out-of the money when buying an option. Instead when dealing with two-sided
payoff derivatives such ad Forward and Swap contracts, for Enel the DVA is
sometimes higher than CVA. This reflects in the CCR adjusted prices, which are
higher compared to the default-free one. In other words, when considering its
own default risk19 Enel sees the value of the contract become higher, given the
positive probability of occurrence of a joint event of its own default and negative
EAD.
1.5 Conclusions
In the present Chapter a Le`vy-based structural model has been applied to the
computation of CVAs and DVAs for energy commodities derivative claims. In
accordance with Ballotta et al. (2015) credit events are modelled as the first-
passage time at a predetermined down barrier, albeit the present work differs
since it is focused on the equity side of the firm value. Equity has been preferred
since it is a tradable asset. The relevant risk drivers are NIG processes obtained
by brownian subordination. By applying some asset pricing principles I derived
a model-independent additive formula for bilateral Counterparty Credit Risk
adjustments. The derivation does not require specific modelling assumptions on
defaults mechanisms or particular hedging portfolios. My numerical application,
18 European-style derivatives are generally traded into regulated markets. They have been
here considered for the sake of simplicity in the exposition.
19 This practise was recognized by IFRS 13 accounting principles and desirable in order to
reach symmetric prices, so that the two negotiating parties can agree upon the value of the
deal.
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in the light of the non Gaussian underlying sources of risk, required the imple-
mentation of a hybrid Fourier-Monte Carlo approach in which both calibrations
and exposures have been computed through the Fourier Cosine Series (COS)
method and default processes have been simulated via Monte Carlo. As expected,
in the Monte Carlo simulation the volatility still plays the key role in generating
defaults. My numerical results show that, by considering counterparts with
similar CDS spreads which negotiate OTC derivatives issued on commodity
assets, the size of CVAs and DVAs range around 0,3% and 15%.
Next work will accomplish the need of incorporating the economic role played
by Funding Valuation Adjustments (FVA) as well as addressing the issue of
bilateral collateralization. In that regards, a particular focus is required for
margining procedures under Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs).
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2. ON THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF FUNDING VALUATION
ADJUSTMENTS (FVA) AND INITIAL MARGIN VALUATION
ADJUSTMENS (MVA)
ABSTRACT
The global financial crisis revealed that no economic entity can be considered
default-free any more, so that both banks and corporate firms have to cope with
bilateral Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) when negotiating OTC derivatives.
Since the mainstream approach typically used in practical settings is to evaluate
derivatives in terms of the cost of their respective hedging strategies, the pricing
of CCR metrics implicitly relates to the way these strategies are financed. Within
the numerical section of the present work, the valuation adjustments for CCR
have been computed. Moreover, the role played by funding costs and their
impact in widening bid-ask spreads have been assessed. A similar reasoning has
been applied for the investigation of the cost of funding Initial Margins (IM),
typically effective on top of Variation Margins (VM) when trading under Central
Clearing Counterparties (CCPs). As the Initial Margin Valuation Adjustment
(MVA) is concerned, it is here showed that, differently from what can happen
for FVAs, no offsetting effect can materialize. As a consequence, in aggregate
terms IMs can cause systemic liquidity effects. The computed XVA metrics are
relative to energy commodities OTC derivative trades.
Keywords: XVA Metrics, Pricing, Hedging, Funding Costs, Funding Spread,
FVA, Bid-Ask Spread, Transaction Costs, Central Clearing, MVA.
2.1 Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis revealed that neither high creditworthiness insti-
tutions can be considered default-free, so that both financials and corporations
have to cope with bilateral Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) when trading
OTC derivatives. From the operational point of view, the standard practice is
to evaluate derivative claims in terms of the cost for their respective hedging
strategies. As a consequence, both derivative prices and CCR metrics depend
on how the hedging is financed. In the light of the exceptional growth of credit
spreads it has been observed during the crisis, the impact of funding costs on
the balance-sheets of major dealers has been massive.
From a regulatory side, it is still missing a unified standard framework to
incorporate the costs faced for financing hedging strategies. Such framework
will probably lack even in incoming times because of the the very high degree of
complexity implied by funding modelling. Among industry participants, the first
mover was J.P. Morgan Chase which, in its Q1 2014 public report announced
that Funding Valuation Adjustments (FVA) had been accounted for the amount
of US$ 1.5 billions. Many recognized that announcement as the first relevant
move in financial industry, stimulating other dealers to align. Thereafter, some
of the major consultancy firms such as EY and KPMG, publicly declared their
acceptance of accounting for FVAs. Nevertheless, the debate on funding costs is
still ongoing because of their asymmetry and non pure additivity. Their nature
of valuation adjustment or profitability analysis tool has still to be clarified.
2.1.1 Brief literature review of the FVA debate, Netting and Initial Margins
In both academic and operational environments, the investigation of funding
costs dramatically widened as a consequence of the global financial crisis. From
the very beginning, it became clear that the inclusion of funding costs within
pricing frameworks would have involved an unprecedented risk management
challenge from the technical point of view. Since the publication of the work
of Hull and White (2012), who raised some doubts regarding the theoretical
foundations of adjusting derivatives prices for funding, the FVA debate became
even more passionate. Dozens of follow-up papers followed to that article.
One among early relevant attempts to embed funding costs within a unified
valuation framework can be recovered in Burgard and Kjaer (2011b). Within
their derivation of a pricing formula, the Authors assumed bilateral default
risk. Relying on a extended version of the Black and Scholes (1973) model,
the Authors derived a PDE describing the adjusted price dynamics, which they
solved by means of the Feynman-Ka`c Theorem. The Authors proposed a hedging
strategy through which the bank holds a usual delta position in the underlying
and a appropriate amount of cash. Moreover, for the purpose of treating both
the CCR and funding costs, the bank was assumed to hedge out the default risk
by short selling the counterparty bonds (CVA risks) and by repurchasing back
its own debt (DVA risks). The generalized PDE which they derived displayed to
be flexible enough for being adapted to several possible scenarios, e.g. risk-free
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close-outs rather then replacement close-outs and no funding haircut1 rather than
non zero funding spread. In their work it is discussed the numerical computation
of CCR metrics for a vanilla option. In the conclusive remarks, they claimed that
possible extensions of their model could relate to the analysis of more complex
exotic payoffs, netted portfolios, correlated defaults together with the allowance
of stochastic interest and hazard rates.
In Burgard and Kjaer (2011a) it can be retrieved a first attempt to model
balance-sheet implications of the choice among several attainable funding strate-
gies. The Authors suggested two possible scenarios in which funding effects can
be neglected. The first concerns the case in which the derivative can be posted
as collateral and thenceforth, no haircut is charged by the external funder. The
other one is relative to the case in which the dealer is able to strategically trade
in its own bonds with different maturities.
In the work of Hull and White (2012), the Authors argued that FVAs should
not be taken into account when evaluating derivatives. They suggested that the
FVA is mainly arising from the cost faced for financing hedging strategies, but
since the trading in hedging instruments is usually closed at market prices, these
are null expected yield investments. For this reason, hedging should not affect
derivatives valuation. Furthermore, according to the well known corporate finance
principle expressed by the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, under some theoretical
assumptions2 funding should be considered apart from investments decisions.
They concluded that, since funding does not reflect any economic value, if
considered when making investment decisions it would lead to poor choices with
respect to the shareholders profit maximization.
The papers of Cre´pey et al. (2013) and Brigo et al. (2015) among others,
share the modelling approach of adding the cash flows relative to hedging funding
and collateral margining to those of the derivative payoff when computing the
adjusted derivatives prices. Taking into account the funding issue in pricing
increases considerably calculation complexity. While the CVA causes nonlinearity
in the payoff, the inclusion of funding costs makes the pricing operator itself to
become nonlinear. Under such theoretical framework, as the current derivative
price depends on the value of the FVA term in the future, which in turn depends
on the future CCR adjusted price path, the pricing problem becomes recursive.
For this reason, together with other Authors, they addressed the computation
of FVAs via the Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs) Theory.
At first glance, they performed the numerical computation by discretizing the
pricing problem through suitable BSDE schemes and than solved it by means of
American Monte Carlo techniques. In Cre´pey et al. (2013) the pricing of CCR
adjustments is analysed with respect to different collateral margining schemes
and close-outs rules upon default. Moreover, they managed to disentangle the
FVA term by isolating the liquidity from the credit component, claiming that
1 No haircut applies when the derivative can be posted as collateral, so that the bank can
borrow virtually at the risk-free rate.
2 Despite this statement the Authors themselves admitted that there can realistically
configure exceptions: for instance, in some countries tax benefits are recognized to debt
financing so that it might be preferred to equity financing.
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just the first one should be considered in pricing.
Brigo et al. (2015) similarly derived a general pricing formula in presence
of replacement close-outs, collateral and funding risk by relying on a BSDE
representation or on a semi-linear PDE setting, alternatively. Nevertheless,
the Authors raised some concerns about the inclusion of asymmetric funding
rates into pricing, pointing out the consequent inconsistency with respect to
the Law of One Price. In these regards, they argued that it is common belief
among market operators to consider Funding Valuation Adjustments as the main
driver of bid-ask spreads in the years of financial crisis. Besides they raised
concerns about the separability of risks in the light of the recursive nature of
funding, whose asymmetry could also induce arbitrage opportunities. In their
paper, it have been derived both discrete-time and continuous-time solutions. In
the computational part of their work, it have been discussed a numerical case
study extending Black and Scholes (1973) by using both backward and forward
simulations and Least Squares Monte Carlo techniques. They claimed that the
standard practice of removing nonlinearities by averaging asymmetric borrowing
and lending rates and substituting replacement close-outs by risk-free close-outs
causes a valuation error that they defined Nonlinearity Valuation Adjustment
(NVA). They concluded that in general FVA is not a pure additive adjustment
term as it has been commonly assumed by most market participants in simplified
approaches. The Authors underlined that the introduction of funding costs in
derivative valuation violates the bilateral nature of the deal price, posing doubts
about the two counterpart’s capability to close the trade. Indeed, they took
leave of the reader with some comments about the distinction between price and
value as well as the possibility to use FVAs as a cost analysis tool.
In Brigo et al. (2016) it is summarized the dialogue undertaken during the
conference Challenges in Derivatives Markets held at Technische Universitat
Munchen in March/April 2015. The point of Brigo was to underline the role of
nonlinearities and to wonder whether in practical applications they should be
embraced rather than be linearised. He argued that dealing with nonlinearities is
too complex on daily basis, since they imply the need to repeat the evaluation at
any relevant aggregation level. Furthermore, he raised provocative issues of self-
fulfilling prophecies in pricing, occurring when the majority of agents is adopting
wrong methodologies and other participants have to align in order to stay in
the market. Fries started by remarking that, in the current financial market
there could be funding arbitrage opportunities, as dealers with poor funding can
swap against other ones with better funding in order to allow both to make a
profit. According to him the new cutting edge in the current market landscape is
related to Netting, since we can observe portfolio effects because of nonlinearities.
Moreover, he stressed the issue of lack of data for calibration purposes. Hull
explained that, being trained in finance, his view about FVA differs from the
one of those trained in physics or mathematics. In corporate finance when
investment opportunities are being evaluated, only the direct riskiness related to
the investment is relevant, while the way the investment is financed is negligible.
He remarked the difficulties one incurs when trying to disentangle default risk
from other components, such as liquidity, from the overall funding cost. He also
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agreed with Brigo about possible threats of self-fulfilling prophecies in financial
industry related to uniform pricing routines. He pointed out that regulators are
concerned about pricing derivatives in terms of the mark-to-market rather than
costs coverage and, since the regulatory trend is going toward the imposition of
full central clearing collateralization schemes to most of OTC transactions, he
expected that the FVA would not be an issue in few years. Sommers remarked
that the main concern of accountants is the fair value, which in the case of
financial derivatives is defined as the exit price. That concept is somehow related
the self-fulfilling prophecies argument. In fact, if the majority of operators are
taking into account some aspects in their evaluation systems, the price one would
be proposed in the case of exiting from the trade would likely include those
aspects. This still represents a puzzle, since the products interested by FVA are
typically not so accessible on Bloomberg or other data providers. He insisted on
the issue of portfolio effects, since the unit of account is not unique. For instance,
the CVA is generally not referred to the single deal but to a given netting set.
As far as the FVA is concerned, the unit of account is typically a given funding
set, for instance all the trades denominated in a given currency. He concluded
that, in the light of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the inclusion of the role of
FVA in pricing would impact on the whole derivative pricing paradigm.
In their recent paper, which has gained notably interest among both aca-
demics and industry operators3, Andersen et al. (2017), rather than reconnecting
the FVA within a unified pricing framework, singled out in funding an incre-
mental cost which impacts on the shareholders section of the balance-sheet and
does not affect fair valuation. They highlighted that the conventional prac-
tice of accounting for FVAs as additive valuation adjustments had produced a
theoretical inconsistency which could be quantified in a 6 US$ billions worth
accounting mistake. They derived a pecking order of shareholders preferences
about several funding strategies of new investments. Possible strategies range
among financing new investments through debt issuing, rather than equity is-
suing or by withdrawing available cash from the balance-sheet. The Authors
introduced a marginal theory for investment choices; firstly grounded in the use
of a two-periods structural model, later extended to multi-periods settings and
finally to a continuous-time equivalent reduced-form model. Such theory has then
been applied to evaluate the economic convenience for the firm’s shareholders
in entering in additional swap trades. They put the basis for a fully consistent
balance-sheet structural model, by which they showed that default events impact
on both assets and liabilities sides. The Authors affirmed that FVAs do not affect
derivative valuation but they are rather responsible of some widening in the
bid-ask spread that dealers typically quote to their clients. They claimed that
if traders operate according to the interest of firm’s shareholders, they should
not enter into swap trades at the fair price since, because of the incremental
funding costs, the shareholders need to be compensated by the counterpart
through a windfall equal at least to the sum of funding costs and the DVA
3 see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-11/professor-to-wall-street-you-
re-doing-swaps-accounting-wrong
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term4. In the light of the inefficient nature of OTC markets, characterized by
opaqueness and searching costs, funding costs might be an incentive which can
align traders’ activity to shareholders value maximization. They affirmed that
in the market it have been observed acquisitions of swap portfolios by dealers for
which funding costs are less severe with respect to others. For this reason, the
Authors suggested the establishment of XVA optimization desks able to quantify
the impact on the equity side of additional funding and margining costs. Finally,
in a numerical application the Authors provided the results of a calculation of
XVA measures for plain vanilla Interest Rate Swaps (IRS).
As it will be pointed out later in the present Chapter, the topic of funding
should be investigated in relation with the appropriate aggregation level. In
practical settings, treasuries calculate funding requirements not focusing just on
a single portfolio but in relation, for instance, to a given netting set denominated
in given currency. Moreover, allowing for netted exposures leads to relevant
implications for credit related credit related XVA terms. Among other references
in previous literature, a significant study of netting can be found in Brigo and
Masetti (2006), which analyse the unilateral CVA in the case of interest rate
swaps (IRS) portfolios towards a single counterpart. In their work, they compare
the effectiveness of several netting schemes in terms of resulting overall exposure.
The Authors underline how incorporating netting agreements in the general CCR
pricing framework increases considerably the degree of complexity as, upon a
default event, CVA configures as an option term on the residual present value of
the whole netted portfolio. This cannot be evaluated as a standard Swaption, so
that one needs to resort to Monte Carlo simulation5 or to derive some analytical
approximations. By exploiting the independence hypothesis between interest
rates and default times, approximated formulas have been derived in order to
estimate on default exposures.
In the case an investor negotiate with a single counterpart several long and
short positions on IRS with different tenors and maturities, overall cash flows to
be paid by both the fixed and floating legs sum up at each resetting date. As a
consequence, floating leg payments result in (positive and negative) multiplies of
the underlying LIBOR and agreed contractual swap rates. In the case the IRS
constituting a portfolio towards a single counterpart are possibly long or short,
the portfolio evaluation becomes similar to that of a single IRS with different
multiples of LIBOR and predetermined swap rates. In such cases the pricing
can be computed via the Drift Freezing Technique which however, is reliable
within some reasonable limits. In fact, in the case of allowing IRS trades in
the portfolio to be both directions, the picture becomes even more interesting
since, the overall residual present value of the IRS portfolio at the early default
time can be seen as an option on the difference between two swap rates, each
approximately lognormal. The Authors decide to evaluate such option by means
of the Three Moment Matching procedure. In their numerical tests, the accuracy
4 I here recall that the DVA term represents a wealth transfer from shareholders, who earn
nothing upon default, to legacy bondholders.
5 The simulation can be performed in the context of LIBOR Market Model or Swap Market
Model, alternatively.
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of both analytically approximated formulas is checked through a comparison
against the results obtainable via Monte Carlo. The comparison of analytical
approximations and Monte Carlo simulation has been carried out in relation to
different netting schemes.
In their work, Brigo and Masetti (2006) consider a N -dimensional IRS
portfolio with homogeneous resetting dates but differentiated start and maturity
dates. Let Ta and Tb being the first start and the last maturity dates of the IRS
portfolio, respectively. Then, for all i ∈ [a+ 1, b]:
αi = βi |
N∑
j=1
Ajiφj |, Ki = βi |
N∑
j=1
AjiK
j
i φj | (2.1)
χi = sign
 N∑
j=1
Ajiφj
 , ψi = sign
 N∑
j=1
AjiK
j
i φj
 (2.2)
where βi is the year fraction between two consecutive resetting dates, A
j
i > 0
is the notional amount relative to the j-th IRS at the resetting date Ti, φj is
the payer/receiver fixed rate flag which takes values in {−1, 1}, i.e. 1 for payer
and -1 for receiver. Kji is the fixed rate to be paid in the j-th IRS at Ti reset
time. Please note that χi may be different from ψi. The Authors denote by
L(Ti−1, Ti) the LIBOR rate in place between times Ti−1 and Ti.
The discounted payoff of the IRS portfolio, evaluated at time t < Ta, can be
written as:
ΠPirs(t) =
b∑
i=a+1
D(t, Ti)[χiαiL(Ti−1, Ti)− ψiKi]
=
b∑
i=a+1
D(t, Ti)χi[αiL(Ti−1, Ti)− K˜i]
(2.3)
where K˜i ≡ (ψiχi ) and αi is called netting coefficient in front of the Libor rates
in the total IRS portfolio towards a given counterpart while K˜i represent the
cumulated fixed rate of the total portfolio of IRS to be exchanged at time Ti.
The expected value at time t of a default-free IRS portfolio is known to be:
EQt [ΠPirs(t)] =
b∑
i=a+1
P (t, Ti)χi[αiFi(t)− K˜i] (2.4)
where P (t, Ti) is the price at time t of the default-free zero coupon bond expiring
in Ti and Fi(t) is the LIBOR forward rate. It is remarked that each expectation
in the sum can be easily computed by resorting to the related forward measure.
The Authors then introduce CCR risk by considering unilateral CVA settings,
so that:
EQt [ΠDPirs(t)] = E
Q
t [ΠPirs(t)]− LGDCEQt [1{τC<Tb}D(t, τC)(ετC )+] (2.5)
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where ετC = EQτC [ΠPirs(τC)].
In these regards, they stress that the price of a default-free IRS portfolio is
model-independent being forwards and discount curves sufficient in the evaluation,
so that there is no need to postulate a dynamics for the term structure. However
the inclusion of counterparty risk adds an optionality level which makes the
evaluation model dependent even if the original payoff was model-independent.
Under the cited independence hypothesis between interest rates and the credit
sector, the Authors simplify the pricing problem by assuming that the default is
postponed to first time Ti following τC , so that the CVA can be rewritten as:
CV A = LGDC
b∑
i=a+1
Q{τC ∈ [Ti−1, Ti]}EQt [D(t, Ti)(εTi)+] (2.6)
where
εTi =
b∑
k=i+1
P (Ti, Tk)χk[αkFk(Ti)− K˜k]
Hence, the value of a CCR risky IRS portfolio has been decomposed into the
sum of a swap with a non standard coefficients and a series of swaption prices
weighted by a stream of default probabilities. It is than showed that, by some
rearrangements, the swaption price in 2.6 can be rewritten in terms of the Black
price of a option issued on the well defined underlying forward overall swap rate
Sˆi,b(Ti):
In order to price such stream of swaptions the Authors make use of the Drift
Freezing Technique (DF) which is similar to other approximated swaption pricing
formulas available in literature. The technique consists in evaluating swaptions
in terms of Black option prices issued on underlying IRS trades, see the original
work of Brigo and Masetti (2006) for full technical details. The Authors expected
this approximation working properly only in the cases all IRS in the portfolio
had the same direction, i.e. all χ’s are equal each other. In other words, this
would mean that the overall swap rate would have the same sign in all scenarios
so that the Brownian Motion could represent a reasonable approximation of its
dynamics. Otherwise, in cases with mixed χ’s (i.e.a portfolio with both long
and short IRS) the robustness of this technique has to be carefully checked.
Otherwise in order to properly handle the pricing, one might still apply the DT
technique and resort on suited put-call parity arguments. However, the Authors
have found the accuracy of DF being unsatisfactory in cases of mixed netting
coefficients and since linear combinations of lognormal variables is no longer
lognormal, they adopted the Three Moment Matching Technique (3MM), a
method which takes into account an approximate estimation of the third moment
of Sˆi,b(Ti). This is based in matching the first three moments of the underlying
overall swap rate to those of an auxiliary shifted lognormal martingale process.
Hence the Authors exploit the approximation of the swaption price in terms of
the Black formula on the auxiliary process6 .
6 Full technical details are provided in the original work of Brigo and Masetti (2006)
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In the numerical part of the paper, Authors assess the accuracy of described
approximations in computing the expectation of EQt [D(t, Ti)(εTi)+] through
a comparison with the results obtainable by Monte Carlo simulation. They
consider several test parameter sets which include instantaneous volatilities,
correlations, forward rate curves and netting coefficients. The Authors analyse
several possible compositions of the IRS portfolio, in which single trades can share
the first payment date rather than the same last payment date. They investigate
portfolios characterized by all single trades in the same direction as well as IRS
portfolios with mixed χ’s. Moreover, their analysis distinguishes among different
possible levels of initial moneyness and netting schemes. As expected, the
Authors found the Black like approximation (DF) working satisfyingly in cases
netting coefficients have the same sign . Otherwise, in the case of mixed netting
coefficients, DF is less accurate, especially for in the money and out of the money
strikes. In general the more refined 3MM Black approximation outperforms
the DF technique except for few circumstances. The Authors suggest that the
degree of accuracy of approximated formulas is well suited for risk management
purposes. In fact the computational time required to simulate scenarios for each
risk factor is crucial so that an efficient and accurate approximation might be
required in order to contain it.
The Authors conclude that the provision of netting schemes lowers con-
siderably the valuation adjustment due to CCR. However without a correct
implementation of netting schemes, the overall CVA adjustment would be equal
to the sum of single CVAs, implying the multiple counting of the default impact
of flows figuring in more than one IRS. Since it holds:
(ΠIRS1 + ΠIRS2 + ...+ ΠIRSn)
+ ≤ Π+IRS1 + Π+IRS2 + ...+ Π+IRSN
under netting agreements smaller losses upon default are expected with
respect to the no netting case. In other words, netting is effecting to mitigate
the valuation adjustment for counterparty default risk, i.e. the CVA.
Since in recent years regulators had pushed market participants to negotiate
OTC trades under the jurisdiction of Central Clearing Counterparties (CCP),
the final part of the present review is aimed at introducing the topic of initial
margins and related implications. CCPs are commercial entities who interpose
themselves between two counterparts by taking default risk and ensuring con-
tractual payments even in case of credit events. If the default of a clearing
member occurs, the deal is transferred to one among backup clearing members
taking part to a competitive auction, so that slight residual CCR risk remains in
place. Moreover, the inclusion of CCP into the picture does not fully eliminate
counterparty risk since these can go bankruptcy themselves.
Initial Margins (IM) represent an additional layer of collateralization, required
by CCPs, to those negotiating under their jurisdiction and are supposed to cover
additional risks on top of traditional market and credit ones. These might
be identified with deteriorating quality of collateral, wrong-way risk, potential
additional losses arising during the margin period of risk as well as gap risks,
namely the adverse variation in mark to market since the last collateral margining
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date. As it was discussed within the first Chapter review, some asset classes are
highly affected by gap risk, for instance credit and CDS in particular.
Since IM represent additional collateral amounts segregated in CCP accounts,
there configures a asymmetric collateral agreement. Initial margins are typically
estimated by the CCP according to prevailing market conditions and the expected
maturity of the portfolio. Moreover, CCP can adopt multipliers or require
additional margins to absorb potential losses in case of default or downgrade of a
clearing member and the consequent passage to a backup member. In accordance
with ISDA (2013a), which defines the guidelines of Standard Collateral Support
Annex (SCSA) agreements, the collateral posted to CCPs is called daily and is
remunerated at overnight rates. On the other side, similarly to cleared trades,
SCSA is pushing privately collateralized deals to embrace CCP-style initial
margins. It can be stated that regulatory the trend evolves towards bilateral
CSA collateralized deals resembling more an more to cleared trades. IM can be
posted several time during the life of the deal as, for instance, deterioration of
gap risk and related issues occur.
In the light of the massive impact on pricing, hedging and risk management
related to the above discussed trend, Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) introduced
a general approach for pricing derivative claims under CCP clearing including
variation and initial margins. They point out that derivative prices depend on
the choice of the investor and its counterpart to adopt a bilateral CSA rather
than the interposition of a Central Clearing Counterparty. Furthermore they
discuss numerical cases in the context of Interest Rate Swaps.
In the introductory section, the Authors argue that since the summer of 2007,
as a consequence of the credit crunch, the term structure of forward rates as well
as market quotes of zero coupon bonds started to violate standard non arbitrage
relations. At first glance, that was partly due to the liquidity crisis affecting
funding operations. Few months later it became clear that, as counterparty
risk in the market started growing, the crisis was following a typical spiral
pattern which might have caused a systemic break-down freezing credit lines. In
such financial landscape, standard pricing models based on ideal risk-free rates,
absence of credit risks and unrestricted access to funding instruments became
inadequate. As in their previous works, the Authors stress that instead of a
new and somehow ad hoc pricing theory, additional features characterizing the
current financial environment can be introduced in terms of modified payoffs.
Under suitable assumptions the Authors approximate the impact of hedging,
funding and margining procedures in pricing equations in terms of modifications
of discount factors and forward rates. The framework which they propose is fully
arbitrage-free and is based on market observables. Moreover, they suggest that
such modifications should be included also in the calibration and bootstrapping
algorithms used to calculate model parameters. The framework proposed in
Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) achieves a rigorous quasi separable decomposition of
nonlinear interconnected risks into different valuation adjustments, which does
not hold in general but is possible in some simplified settings. They argue that
the mathematical nonlinearities arising from allowing for asymmetric borrowing
and lending rates in the hedge of claims leading to deal dependent pricing
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measures and aggregation dependent valuations, hold for both CCP cleared and
bilateral CSA trades.
In their work the Authors introduce a master pricing equation which takes
into account all factors which affect the replication price of a derivative claim:
Vˆt = EQ[Π(t, T ∧ τ) + γ(t, T ∧ τ) + ϕ(t, T ∧ τ) + 1{t≤τ≤T}D(t, τ)θτ | Gt] (2.7)
where Π(t, T ∧ τ) is the sum of discounted payoff in the interval (t, T ∧ τ),
γ(t, T ∧ τ) is the collateral in the interval (t, T ∧ τ), ϕ(t, T ∧ τ) represents the
funding costs in the interval (t, T ∧ τ) while θτ is the replacement cost of the deal
upon default, i.e. the close-out amount, expressed as function of the residual
cash flows and collateral amounts, which originates the usual CVA/DVA terms.
More in detail, the sum of cash flows indicated in the above equation can be
written as:
Vˆt =
∫ T
t
EQ[1{u<τ}D(t, u)(Π(u, u+ du) + 1{τ∈du}θu) | Gt]du
+
∫ T
t
EQ[1{u<τ}D(t, u)((fu − cu)Mu + (ru − fu)Vˆu − (ru − hu)Hu) | Gt]du
+
∫ T
t
EQ[1{u<τ}D(t, u)((fN
C
u − cu)NCu + (fN
B
u − cu)NBu ) | Gt]du
(2.8)
where ft is the funding rate at time t, ct is the collateral accrual rate at time t, rt
is the risk-free rate at time t, ht is the repo lending rate for hedging instruments
at time t while fN
C
t and f
NB
t represent the funding rates for financing initial
margins faced by the counterpart and the bank, respectively. The Authors
distinguish between these from the funding rate f as they belong to different
netting sets. Moreover, Mt is the variation margin at time t, Ht represents the
value of hedging instruments at time t while NC and NC are the initial margins
posted by the counterpart and the bank, respectively.
The above formula is an equation rather than a closed form since Vˆ appears
also in the right-hand side and future rates can depend on it. As it is shown by
equations 2.7 and 2.8, the derivative price is sensitive to the choice regarding
funding and collateral margining agreements. In fact, the Authors stress that the
replication price of the contract holding between two counterparts under bilateral
CSA is different from an equivalent one cleared with a CCP. By the application
of suitable technical assumptions (see the original work for full details), Brigo
and Pallavicini (2014) show how to derive a Backward Stochastic Differential
Equation (BSDE) representation of their master pricing equation:
dVˆtdt−ftVˆt+Π(t, t+dt)+(ft−ct)Mtdt+(fNCt −ct)NCt dt+(fN
I
t −ct)dt = dMht
(2.9)
with the terminal condition set at time τ ∧ T as:
Vˆτ∧T = 1{τ<T}θτ (2.10)
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whereMht is a martingale under Qh, which is the probability measure equivalent
to Q, under which risky assets in the economy grow at the repo lending rate
h (rather than the risk-free rate r). It appears clear that, through suitable
numeraire changes, even if the evaluation started as the expectation under
the risk neutral measure, the pricing equation can be rewritten in order to
independent from the risk-free rate. This configures as an advantage since the
risk-free rate is a fictitious instrumental variable not observable in real markets
any more.
The resulting BSDE is nonlinear, since variation and initial margins as well
as asymmetric funding, collateral and repo lending rates might depend on the
future derivative adjusted value Vˆ itself and on its partial derivatives used for
hedging purposes. As a consequence of nonlinearities, the valuation is no longer
additive, namely the price of a portfolio does not equal to the sum of individual
assets (so that one has to chose ex ante the relevant aggregation level) and the
pricing measure is deal dependent since the valuation is performed under the
Qh. The fundamental nonlinearity at the level of the pricing operator represents
a further dramatic consequence with respect to that caused by CVA/DVA type
terms, which introduce nonlinearity in the payoffs even of linear products.
However, the Authors point out that within particular conditions the fun-
damental nonlinearity introduced by funding can disappear. For instance by
focusing on the case of interest rate derivatives, whose exposures do not jump
at default, full collateralization schemes in which variation margins equal the
residual mark to market, the adoption of collateralized hedging instruments
traded at the collateral rate ct (typically equal to the overnight rate et) together
with suited modelling choices for credit spreads and liquidity basis, permit the
achievement of a numerical scheme for solving the pricing BSDE in which the
derivative price does not depend any more on future levels of the funding rate f
and on future values of the derivative itself Vˆ .
The Authors remind that the funding inclusive price is not separable in general
in clear-cut components related to credit, debit and funding. Nevertheless under
the assumptions formulated for the interest rates case, separability can be
partially achieved. By the application of the Control-Variate Technique they
obtain a decomposition in pieces of financial meaning. In these regards, the
Initial Margin Valuation Adjustment (MVA), i.e. the expected cost faced for IM
financing, equals to:
MVA =
∫ T
t
EQ
e
[De+λ
C+λB (t, u)(NCu`
NC
u +N
B
u`
NB
u ) | Ft]du (2.11)
where λB and λC are the default intensities of the bank and its counterpart
while `N
B
and `N
C
are the liquidity basis charged by the respective treasuries
for financing IM amounts. Separability can be achieved in the case of CCP
cleared trades as well as for bilateral trades under SCSA. In order to reach such
result the limitation attains to the need of dealing with F-adapted close -out
amount and assuming F-conditional independence of default times. In fact, if
these conditions are not met, it is not possible to switch the evaluation under
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the default-free market filtration.
Focusing on IRS, the Authors have compared the impact on derivative valua-
tion of initial margins differentiating between the case of a bilateral collateralized
trade and that of a CCP cleared one. While under CCP trading the additional
layer of collateralization is asymmetric, in other words IM is posted only by the
client towards the clearing member, in bilateral SCSA contracts both the two
counterparts post VM as well as IM. Moreover, if bilateral the SCSA agreement
allows the rehypotecation of initial margins, the client might exploit a funding
benefit which otherwise, is not achievable under CCP clearing.
Initial margins are typically calculated as some market risk measure, such
as historical Value-at-Risk (VaR) or Expected Shortfall (ES). According to
their modelling framework, Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) suggest to be calculate
the initial margin as Monte Carlo VaR, whose estimation under the physical
probability measure is approximated by simulating under Qh:
NCt = inf{x ∈ IR+ | Qh{εt+δ − εt ≤ x | Ft} ≥ 1− α} (2.12)
and only for bilateral trades under SCSA:
NBt = sup{x ∈ IR− | Qh{εt+δ − εt ≥ x | Ft} ≥ 1− α} (2.13)
Furthermore in order to speed up the simulation, the Authors make use of the
Moment Matching Technique to approximate the conditional expectations in
above formulas as it follows:
NCt ' Φ−10,νt(1− α) (2.14)
where Φµ,ν is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution with
mean µ and standard deviation ν, which are given by:
µt = 0, ν
2
t = Var
h(εt+δ | Ft)
The Authors assume that in the bilateral SCSA case, the initial margin posted
by bank is:
NBt ' −NCt (2.15)
being zero in the CCP case.
In the numerical part of the paper, the Authors assess the impact of coun-
terparty risk, funding, collateral and initial margin on the pricing of 10y-IRS
and compare the cases of uncollateralized, bilateral SCSA and CCP cleared
trades. They assume the absence of gap risks as IRS exposures should not
jump at default, so that initial margins specifically cover adverse exposition
movements during the margin period of risk. The Authors investigate the impact
of correlation between market and credit risks, credit spreads volatilities and
liquidity basis within a single curve framework7, so that all relevant rates can be
derived from overnight rates. Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) model interest rates
7 The extension to multicurve setting is straightforward.
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under the Qe pricing measure by the two-factors shifted Hull & White model
calibrated to swaptions volatilities:
et ≡ ϕt +
2∑
i=1
xi (2.16)
where ϕt is a time-dependent deterministic shift used to calibrate the term
structure of zero coupon curves. The two factors dynamics are described by the
following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dxit = −aixitdt+ σidW it , xi0 = 0 (2.17)
where ai and σi are positive constants and W i are standard Brownian Motions.
In their work, the Authors make use of reduced-form credit approach and model
stochastic intensities λ of the counterparts involved in the transaction as shifted
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) square-root processes:
λit = y
i
t + ψ
i
t, i ∈ {B,C} (2.18)
where λi are the respective default intensities of the bank B and its counter-
parts C and ψi are deterministic non negative shifts. The diffusive component
evolves as follows:
dyit = κ
i(µi − yit)dt+ νi
√
yitdW
i
t , i ∈ {B,C,E} (2.19)
Overnight rates and default intensities are then correlated via a correlation
matrix of elements ρi,j defined as:
d〈Wi,Wj〉t = ρi,jdt
In their numerical experiments, the Authors find that the impact of funding
disappears when borrowing and lending rates equal each other, while in presence
of asymmetric funding rates the difference between long and short quotes can
be interpreted in terms of bid-ask spread widening. In the case of partial
collateralization they observe residual CVA/DVA, due also to the lack of initial
margins absorbing the losses possibly generated during the margin period or risk.
They show that initial margins are effective in covering losses due to extreme
events at the very high confidence levels suggested by ISDA and CCP, but they
might be responsible of a significant increase of funding costs. Despite the use
of very high confidence levels in computing initial margins, the Authors observe
residual CVA and DVA in bilateral SCSA trades while in the CCP case the CVA
is practically null.
According to 2013 Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS), the impact arising
from the introduction of model based IM amounted to 0.7 trillion EUR. From
the regulatory point of view, the consultation paper ISDA (2013b) aims at
implementing the guidelines published by BCBS-IOSCO (2013). These are
of extreme importance for practitioners since relate to the establishment of a
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common methodology for calculating the exchange of initial margins among cover
entities. A shared methodology is fundamental for helping disputes resolution
and allowing consistent regulatory compliance. In fact, if each covered entity
were to apply its own internal model for initial margins, it would have to do
reverse engineering in order to build the margin model that its counterpart was
using and ensure the correctness of its margin call. Duplicating all counterparts
margin models is infeasible beyond that probably impossible. For this reason
the industry has developed the Standard Initial Margins Model (SIMM) for non
cleared derivatives. The firsts insights of ISDA relate to the general criteria
which a good model should satisfy. Desirable features for the SIMM would not
being procyclical in order to avoid excess volatility of initial margins, being easy
to replicate also in terms of operational costs, being transparent and appropriate
in order to not underestimate risks in large portfolios.
As the general mathematical structure is concerned, the ISDA suggests to
apply random shocks to all risk factors affecting a given portfolio Π. In these
regards, a multi factor model should be build and in each scenario all risk factors
have to be perturbed. A random shock {Sj,k | j = 1...J} ∈ S, has to be applied
to the k-th risk-factor in the portfolio. Then the loss in front of the random
shock has to be calculated upon each scenario as the difference:
Lj,k = NPV (Π | Sj,k)−NPV (Π) (2.20)
Then all losses have to be put together via the aggregation function A.
Possible choices for the aggregation function are Historical or Monte Carlo
Value-at-Risk (VaR) rather than Expected Shortfall (ES), within a time horizon
corresponding to a 10 days Margin Period of Risk. Hence, the SIMM prescribes
to consider the worst potential loss at the confidence level of 99%. Risk factors
have to be classified in the four asset classes currency/rates, equity, credit and
commodity. Within each asset class i the initial margin IMi can be computed
in terms of the suggested risk measures. Finally, the overall initial margin equals
to the sum of stand alone initial margins of single asset classes:
IM(Π) =
4∑
i=1
IMi (2.21)
Such a synthetic risk measure will correspond to the Initial Margin to be
posted by involved entities. A preliminary analysis revealed that, in terms of IM
consistency, Expected Shortfall (ES) is satisfying while VaR is not.
In order to make dealers able to easily provide quotes and speed up the com-
putation, especially for nonlinear derivatives, a sensitivity approach is preferred
instead of full revaluation, since the latter would require solution of complex
equations. Portfolio greeks are precomputed as delta prices in front of one basis
point risk factors shifts. Sensitivities are then multiplied for simulated shocks.
Recently the ISDA has published the update 2.1 of the SIMM, which however
does not innovate meaningfully the prescribed overall methodology or greeks
estimation but it rather suggests a recalibration of risk-weights and correlation
among risk factors.
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2.1.2 Main contributions
In the first Chapter, a general additive equation for the Bilateral Counterparty
Credit Risk Adjustments (i.e CVA and DVA) has been derived. The solution is
model-independent, meaning that the building blocks of my approach do not
depend on how credit events are modelled. Indeed, the solution is equivalent
to the result usually obtained in the context the reduced-form approaches.
Furthermore, the derivation does not require any specific setup of the hedging
portfolio.
The main contribution of the present Chapter is to extend the computation of
the XVA metrics within the first-passage time framework introduced in Chapter
1 through the assessment of the role of funding and IM costs. The current
analysis inherits the full structural setup built within Chapter 1.
To my knowledge, I differ from most of the previous research by investigating
funding costs from a reversed perspective: instead of starting by the analysis by
adding funding-related discounted cash flows into a unified valuation formula, I
prefer to address the topic by trying to firstly understand the economic meaning of
FVAs. This leads to deep consequences in the interpretation of the FVA term and
represents a theoretical breaking point with respect to previous literature. From
a technical side, the advantages of my approach consist in a set of simplifications
which eliminates the recursion and, under additional assumptions, avoids the
emerging of nonlinearities in the FVA pricing problem8. My line of reasoning
retraces in some ways the approach of Andersen et al. (2017), meaning that the
cost of funding appears to be outside of fair valuation principles but, it is rather
responsible of some widening in the bid-ask spread that typically banks quote to
their clients. In these regards, my improvement on top of previous work relies
on precisely quantifying the size of the bid-ask spread widening throughout a
straightforward approach. Another relevant contribution of my work is to extend
the results of Burgard and Kjaer (2011b), who affirmed that the FVA effect
disappears when the trading desk finances itself with no haircut with respect to
the risk-free rate. Since in this context the distance between ask and bid prices
is driven by the specular view of the moneyness, according to the present model
I expect that FVAs should compensate in some of practical computations, i.e.
when the funding policy is symmetric.
This implies that the impact on the bid-ask spread is null under symmetric
funding policies such as, for instance, the Balance-Sheet Shrinkage, see Castagna
(2014). Conversely, in the case of an asymmetric funding policy, the bid-ask
spread do widen in a significant way. Moreover, within the current financial land-
scape, characterized by negative short term rates, BSS is even more convenient
when compared with risk-free investing.
In the Chapter it also is described a numerical application aimed at computing
the CCR price adjustments assessing also the role played by funding and CCP
margining costs: all these risk metrics are commonly reconnected within the
8 Nevertheless, FVA is not the only source on nonlinearity when dealing with the pricing of
Counterparty Credit Risk.
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family of valuation adjustment known as XVA9. The numerical results confirm my
expectations and reveal significant magnitudes of FVAs and large bid-ask spread
widening only in presence of asymmetric funding rates. As CCP margining costs
are concerned, the impact in in terms of bid-ask spreads widening is more severe
since no offsetting effect can take place as a consequence of symmetric funding
policies.
The Chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 I provide a recap of
the building blocks of the structural model fully described in Chapter 1. In
Section 2.3 I provide an economical interpretation of the Funding Valuation
Adjustments and explain why my view is to exclude them from fair valuation. In
Section 2.4 I decline more deeply the hint of Andersen et al. (2017) as regards the
bid-ask spread widening and discuss its dependence on the funding policy which
the trading desk puts in place. Section 2.5 describes the numerical procedure
applied for the computation of the FVA terms and displays the results of the
consequent bid-ask spread widening in several scenarios. Section 2.6 analyses
the main implications of trading under Central Clearing Counterparties (CCP)
and provides the numerical results for the MVA terms. Section 2.7 draws some
concluding remarks.
2.2 Model setup
For the sake of self-consistency, in this Section I summarize the technical setup
described in details in the first Chapter, since it applied the present analysis. In
a bilateral CCR perspective, I introduce two defaultable counterparts negotiating
some OTC derivative trades denoted by the investment bank B (the dealer) and
its client C (which might be a corporate firm or another bank).
The market is modelled through a filtered probability space (Ω,Q,Gt) where
Ω is the set of possible events, Q is some risk-neutral martingale measure and
the enlarged filtration is defined as Gt ≡ Ft ∨Ht10.
{Ft}0≤t≤T is the reference filtration which contains all market information
except of default events up to time t while {Ht}0≤t≤T is the σ(τ ∧ t)-algebra
generated by the defaults history. τ is the first-to-default random time defined
as τ ≡ τB ∧ τC . I is noted that τ is a G-stopping time and the above filtrations
satisfy the usual conditions of completeness and right-continuity.
An infinitely divisible Le`vy process {Xt}0≤t≤T defined on the filtered proba-
bility space (Ω,Q,Gt) is a stochastic process with stationary and independent
increments, whose distribution allows for non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis11.
For the class of Le`vy processes, it is often impossible to determine the PDF
analytically. Nevertheless, their characteristic function is always available in
closed form thanks to the well-known Le`vy-Khintchine representation:
9 In the acronym the ”X” stands for a varying letter accommodating for several adjustments.
10 Actually, as explained by Brigo et al. (2013) in Chapter 3, in the context of structural
models, F and G coincide by construction since default processes are completely driven by
default-free market information.
11 Higher then second order moments describe the deviation from normality.
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φX(u; t) = E[eıuXt ] = etϕX(u), u ∈ R (2.22)
where ϕX(u) is the characteristic exponent of parameter u with the process
{Xt}t≥0
The Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG) process is a pure jump Le`vy process
which can be obtained by subordinating a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)
to and independent Inverse Gaussian (IV) Process IG(t). The Inverse Gaussian
process, alternatively known as the distributional law of the first-passage time
of the Brownian Motion, is a α-stable subordinator with α = 12 .
The NIG process, similarly to other ones which are obtainable by subordina-
tion, is said to be a time-changed Le`vy process: in other words, it is indexed to
a ”stochastic clock”. Hence the NIG Process presents the following form:
Xt = µIGt + σWIGt (2.23)
Building Le`vy processes by brownian subordination is particularly appealing
from an economic point of view, since the time-change might be interpreted as
the switch from calendar time to business time. This implies to assume that
asset prices mainly are driven by the relevant news, characterized by random
arrival times and random impact on the market. Indeed, the empirical evidence
suggests that gaussianity seems to be recovered under such trading time. The
characteristic exponent in the case of a NIG process is:
ϕX(u) =
1−√1− 2ıθκ+ u2σ2κ
κ
(2.24)
where u is the Fourier parameter, ı is the imaginary unit. As for the meaning
of parameters is concerned, θ ∈ R denotes the skewness of the process, σ > 0 is
the volatility parameter and κ > 0 controls the excess kurtosis of the distribution.
Non Gaussian Le`vy processes have been largely applied in financial modelling
because of their superior capability compared to that of pure diffusion models
to represent the stylized behaviour observed in real markets. More specifically,
Le`vy processes can replicate implied volatility surfaces without overstress model
parameters and can accommodate for jumps, see Cont and Tankov (2004). The
presence of jumps in the path of risky assets implies the market is in general
incomplete12.
In this framework the NIG process Xt is the relevant risk driver for the
uncertain dynamics of the underlying asset St, whose price at time t under the
risk-neutral measure Q is:
St = S0e
(r−q−ϕX(−i))t+Xt (2.25)
where r > 0 is the proxy for the risk-free rate (e.g. EURIBOR/EONIA)
and q > 0 is the continuous dividend yield paid by the underlying stock. µ =
12 Market incompleteness implies it is not possible to replicate every uncertain derivative
payoff through a combination of elementary assets: hence, derivative claims are not redundant.
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r− q − ϕX(−i) is the mean-correcting drift needed in order to allow St to be an
exponential martingale.
Within my structural approach the random default time τ is modelled a la`
Black and Cox (1976), hence as the first-passage time of the firm’s equity at the
level of a fixed default barrier:
τi = inf{t ∈ (0, T ] : Sit ≤ Ki}, i ∈ {B,C} (2.26)
I further assume equation 2.25 describes also the dynamics of equity values
of firms B and C in addition to those of the underlying assets. Then, replacing
it in equation 1.16 it leads to:
τi = inf{t ∈ (0, T ] : Si0e(r−q
i−ϕXi (−i))t+Xi(t) ≤ Ki}
Under Counterparty Credit Risk it is necessary to distinguish between V (t, S),
which denotes the economic value at time t of the default-free derivative contract,
and Vˆ (t, S,DB , DC) which denotes the value of the correspondent counterparty
risky claim. The state processes {Dit}0≤t≤T denote the occurrence of the respec-
tive credit events:
Dit ≡ 1{τi≤t}, i ∈ {B,C}
In the first Chapter, it has been derived a model-independent representation
of the adjusted value of a default-risky derivative claim:
Vˆt = Vt−EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)(ε+τC −RC(ε+τC ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CV A
+EQt [1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)(ε
−
τC −RB(ε−τB ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DVA
(2.27)
where D(t, T ) is a approximated risk-free discount factor, εt is the exposure
computed at time t and RC and RB are respectively the client and the bank
recovery functions upon respective defaults.
As in most practical application, I further suppose that both recovery func-
tions take deterministic a values in [0, 1] and I adopt the risk-free close-outs
convention, meaning that the EAD is equal to the default-free mark-to-market
of the contract Vτ . Hence the previous equation becomes:
Vˆt = Vt − EQt [1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)(1−RC)V +τC ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CV A
+EQt [1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)(1−RB)V −τC ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DVA
(2.28)
2.3 Does the FVA impact on fair-valuation?
From a operational point of view, financial derivatives are priced in terms of the
cost of their hedging strategies. Bearing in mind that risk-free funding is not
available any more in the market, the economic valuation of derivative claims
is depends on the policy by which hedging strategies are financed. In the light
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of the exceptional growth of credit spreads it has been observed during the
crisis, the impact of funding costs on the balance-sheet of major dealers has
been massive. Among others, J.P. Morgan Chase in its Q1 2014 public report
declared Funding Valuation Adjustments (FVA) had been accounted for US$ 1.5
billions. Many experts recognized that announcement as the first relevant move
in the financial industry, stimulating other dealers to align. Thereafter, some
of the major consultancy firms such as EY and KPMG, publicly declared their
acceptance for accounting FVAs. Nevertheless, the debate on funding costs is
still ongoing because of their asymmetry, non linearity and non pure additivity.
Their nature of valuation adjustment or profitability analysis tool has still to
be clarified. So far, FVAs have been treated as additive adjustments on the fair
value of OTC trades, similarly to what happens for CVA and DVA terms.
In line with the argument of Brigo et al. (2015), let me assume that the
evaluating counterpart, which calculates the fair price of the default-risky deal
Vˆ according to equation 2.28, intends to hedge its uncollaterized exposure13 by
running a self-financing portfolio aimed at protecting itself against both market
and credit risks. Going back to the original work of Black and Scholes (1973),
the hedging portfolio is typically composed by a set H of hedging instruments14
and some amount β of cash:
Πt = Vˆt − Ct = Ht + βt + t, t ∈ [0, T ] (2.29)
where C is the cash collateral posted by the out of the money counterpart
and  is a composite hedging error15 due to the incompleteness of the market.
Holding a portfolio for hedging purposes requires the establishment of a funding
account F sufficient to finance both the purchase of hedging instruments and to
hold a cash position:
Ft = Ht + βt = Vˆt − Ct − t (2.30)
In order to mitigate the overall default risk let me assume that rehypotheca-
tion16 not is allowed, so that collateral cannot be used to reduce the amount of
cash required in the funding account:
Ft = Vˆt − t, t ∈ [0, T ] (2.31)
Prior to an eventual rebalance of the portfolio, by the self-financing condition
it must hold:
dFt = dVˆt − dt, t ∈ [0, T ] (2.32)
13 The following computation attains to the seller case. Otherwise, in the buyer case a minus
sign is required to obtain the effective hedge, i.e. Π = −(Vˆ − C).
14 The ”hedges” in the replicating portfolio must have the same cardinality of the sources of
risk.
15 Among other frictions characterizing a model with jumps, even if one is intended to hedge
the DVA, is is impossible to replicate its own jump-to-default risk, since selling protection
through a CDS written on own self is not allowed, nor credible.
16 Rehypothecation is the contractual provision which allows to not keep the cash collateral
”frozen” in a safe bank account and use it as collateral for other OTC positions against other
counterparts.
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let me define τ¯ ≡ τ ∧ T the random default-adjusted expiry of the contract.
By taking the risk-neutral expectation with respect to Q of the sum of time
t-discounted cash flows in the continuous interval [t, τ¯ ], it can be obtained:
EQ
[∫ τ¯
t
D(t, s)dFs | Gt
]
= EQ
[∫ τ¯
t
D(t, s)f˜sVˆsds | Gt
]
−EQ
[∫ τ¯
t
D(t, s)ds | Gt
]
(2.33)
s > t
where
f˜t ≡ f+t 1{Vˆt>0} + f−t 1{Vˆt<0}
The left-hand side of equation 2.33 corresponds to the definition of the FVA
term. f+ and f− are respectively the unsecured borrowing and lending rates faced
by the dealer. In real world transactions these are often asymmetric. In that case,
there configures a complex nonlinear pricing problem which. Furthermore, under
additional modelling assumptions the valuation becomes recursive. Nonlinear
recursive pricing problems have been generally addressed via the Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations Theory (BSDEs), see Cre´pey (2015a) and ?,
among others.
In order to shed light more intuitively on the economic meaning of funding
costs17, let me simplify the problem by assuming that the sign of the hedging
error is not systematic over time. In such case the last term of equation 2.33
would collapse to zero:
EQ
[∫ τ¯
t
D(t, s)ds | Gt
]
↓ 0
By acknowledging the evidence of slightly negative risk-free rates characteriz-
ing the current financial landscape, for small r the discounted funding spread
can be linearised as follows:
lim
r↑0
e−rs(s−t)fs = lim
r↑0
fs − rs (2.34)
Hence, the equation describing the cost of financing, commonly known as Funding
Valuation Adjustment (FVA) becomes:
FV A '
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
(f˜s − rs)Vˆs | Gt
]
ds
=
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
(f+s − rs)Vˆ +s − (f−s + rs)Vˆ −s | Gt
]
ds
(2.35)
17 In a economic perspective they could be viewed as non-null transaction costs: in other
words, these configure as a friction of the post-crisis financial market where no agent can
borrow at the risk-free rate any more.
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Please note that the Fubini’s Theorem has been applied in order to interchange
expectation and integration operators.
Within their outstanding contribution, Andersen et al. (2017) have formally
derived a pecking order of preferences of firm’s shareholders about several
possible funding strategies. These range from financing OTC derivative trades
by withdrawing available cash from the balance-sheet, to issue new unsecured
debt or to issue new equity. Nevertheless, real market conditions could prevent
the choice of using some of them. For instance in major dealers, derivative
trading desks are typically separated entities from the treasury and hence, they
are probably inhibited to take autonomous decisions regarding the use of existing
cash in the balance-sheet. The same applies for equity issuing which moreover,
can probably not be flexible enough for the purposes under discussion.
As the investing side is concerned, in previous FVA modelling any surplus of
cash deriving from entering into derivative positions and their relative hedging,
was assumed to be invested at the risk-free rate in order to not increase the
overall risk in the portfolio. However this assumption might clash with reality
since the current financial environment. In fact, the expansionary monetary
policy trend held by both the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank
(ECB), led to negative short-term risk-free interest rates. In such case, investing
at a below zero risk-free rate would reduce the P&L of the trade. It is not
credible that such strategy would be followed by the trading desk. On the other
hand, suppose traders holding a liquidity surplus can repurchase previously
issued unsecured debt. This practise is known as the ”Balance-Sheet Shrinkage”
funding policy. Under BSS marginal funding benefits equal the marginal cost of
new issued debt, so that borrowing and lending rates compensate each other, i.e.
f− = −f+. Since f+ can be easily inferable from current market quotations, for
instance from the CDS market, the discounted funding rate could be interpreted
as the spread of CDS quotes with respect to the risk-free rate. By recalling the
discounted funding spread expressed in equation 2.34, it can be obtained:
f˜t − rt = (f+t − rt)1{Vˆt>0} + (f−t + rt)1{Vˆt<0}
= (f+t − rt)1{Vˆt>0} + (−f+t + rt)1{Vˆt<0}
= (f+t − rt)1{Vˆt>0} − (f+t − rt)1{Vˆt<0}
= sBt 1{Vˆt>0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted borrowing spread
− sBt 1{Vˆt<0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted lending spread
(2.36)
Let me assume that sBt is the bank fair spread quoted in the CDS market
at time t. Under the stated hypothesis, symmetric borrowing and lending rates
would characterize the expected funding costs such that:
FV A =
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
sBs
(
Vˆ +s − Vˆ −s
)
| Gt
]
ds (2.37)
This result justifies the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 2. In the symmetric case, the Funding Valuation Ad-
justment (FVA), which is defined as the risk neutral expectation of the costs
faced for financing the hedging strategy, might be seen as the expected sum
of discounted funding spreads weighted by the moneyness path of the default
risk-adjusted derivative price Vˆ .
The valuation adjustment for the cost funding the hedging portfolio, is a cost
which do impact on the P&L of the trade. Nevertheless it is dealer-specific, since
it depends on the bank’s excess cost for unsecured borrowing (which I showed to
be its CDS spread) and on the choice regarding the way to finance the hedging
strategy for the overall risk.
As concerns the positive part of the exposure, the inclusion of FVA in fair
pricing would imply to make the client paying for both its default risk and the
one of the bank (through the FVA charge). I retain that it pointless. Conversely,
as regards the negative side of the exposure, accounting for the FVA benefit
would make the dealer paying in proportion to:
• Its own default risk in the amount of EQt [1τ=τB (1−RB)D(t, τB)] through
the DVA term
• Its excess cost for unsecured borrowing, i.e. its CDS credit spread sB
through the inclusion of FVA benefit term
These two elements describe basically the same effect, as they both measure
the price of default risk of the bank with respect to a perfectly default-free
counterpart. Because of that, there configures a high degree of overlap18 with
the DVA term when including the funding benefit in pricing models.
In the light of these arguments, to reconnect the FVA within the fair valuation
principle seems hardly desirable in a theoretical perspective. It rather represents
a friction affecting post-crisis financial markets which appears to be outside of
fair pricing. From a theoretical point of view, my point is to consider desirable
charging to the derivative price only the payoff-related adjustments due to default
risk, i.e. the CVA and the DVA, since they modify the expected size of the
payoff itself.
FVA and additional frictions-based or regulation-based adjustments instead,
should not be included in the fair price. However, since they do impact into
the internal valuation of economic convenience of derivatives trades, they would
better be used as profitability analysis tool as it will be described in the following
section.
18 Some authors have pointed out how investing the FVA funding benefits in own bond
repurchasing configures as a way for DVA hedging.
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2.4 Bid-Ask spreads implications of FVAs
FVAs are well suited to be used as a profitability analysis tool by trading desks
intended in entering into an OTC derivative trade. The reason can be find
in Andersen et al. (2017) who claim that, despite funding costs do not affect
derivative valuation, they are rather responsible of some widening in the bid-
ask spread19. In these regards, my contribution aims at shedding light on the
mechanism leading to the widening in a straightforward way.
In the case of selling the derivative to its counterpart, the dealer’s P&L at
inception equals to:
P&LSell = UAsk − Vˆ − FV AAsk (2.38)
so that the minimum upfront or entry price, at which the trading desk would
be willing to sell (i.e. ask price), would be:
UAsk = Vˆ + FV AAsk (2.39)
This occurs because the trading desk aims at least to be compensated for the
sum of expected cash outflows correspondent to the liability Vˆ and incremental
funding costs deriving from the entrance into the trade.
On the other hand, if the dealer would be intended to hold a long position
into the trade, its P&L at inception would equal to:
P&LBuy = −UBid + Vˆ − FV ABid (2.40)
so that the maximum upfront at which the trader would be willing to buy
(i.e. the bid price) is:
UBid = Vˆ − FV ABid (2.41)
This occurs because the trading desk sees the value which it gets by holding
the derivative security Vˆ , decreased by the additional funding cost.
I here stress that the funding costs faced by the dealer in case of going
long rather than short in the OTC derivative trade are in general different,
i.e. FV ABid 6= FV AAsk. Therefore, the overall widening of the bid-ask spread
caused by funding costs is:
UAsk − UBid = FV AAsk + FV ABid (2.42)
In the next step, I quantify more precisely the amount by which the bid-ask
spread widens when funding costs are incorporated within the analysis. Following
my approach, under a symmetric funding strategy the impact would reflect the
specular view of the moneyness of the contract relatively to the cases of assuming
a long rather then short position in the derivative trade:
19 In fact, the belief which FVA had driven bid-ask spreads during the past years of financial
crisis is rather shared among market participants.
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FV AAsk + FV ABid =
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
sBs
(
Vˆ +s − Vˆ −s
)
| Gt
]
ds
+
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
sBs
(
Vˆ −s − Vˆ +s
)
| Gt
]
ds
(2.43)
By simple rearrangements of equation 2.43 it can be intuitively obtained:
FV AAsk + FV ABid =
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
sBs
((
−Vˆ +s + Vˆ +s
)
−
(
Vˆ −s − Vˆ −s
))
| Gt
]
ds = 0
(2.44)
In other words, under the cited assumptions it holds FV ABid = −FV AAsk.
In presence of symmetry between borrowing and lending spreads, the impact
of funding on the bid-ask spread disappears via an offsetting effect due to
specular view of the moneyness when selling rather than buying. The present
result extends the one of Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) who postulated that
the FVA, interpreted as an additive correction on the fair price, expires when
the funding spread is null. My argument is that the bid-ask spread widening
expires not only in the case of no funding spread, being sufficient that borrowing
and funding spreads are symmetric as in the Balance-Sheet Shrinkage funding
policy. Moreover, such policy would be particularly appealing in the current
market landscape for dealers with a sufficiently liquid own bond market. To my
knowledge, it misses in previous literature a comparative analysis regarding the
efficiency of Balance-Sheet Shrinkage with respect to other funding policies based
on equity repurchasing or on a combination of equity and bond repurchasing.
Such analysis would configure as the extension of the pecking order of preferences
of firms’ shareholders of Andersen et al. (2017) to the investing side of funding
cash flows. I point out that the present analysis applies to the impact of
funding costs on bid-ask spreads and not to the P&L from the perspective of
the shareholders utility maximization20.
Conversely, bid-ask spreads widening is definitely not null when symmetric
funding policies cannot be attained. For instance, suppose that the bank does not
cope with a sufficiently liquid own bond market, meaning that it cannot invest
available liquidity in repurchasing back its own debt at any point in time. In
that scenario, negative rates would represent an extra cost for risk-free investing,
configuring as the price of third party custodial service.
20 In fact as explained by Andersen et al. (2017), the shareholders marginal utility from
entering in a new trade amounts to:
V ∗ = Vˆ −DV A− FV A (2.45)
This occurs since, despite the DVA is nowadays well recognized by accounting principles in
order to allow for symmetric trade prices, it does not involve any real benefit for the equity
side of the firm upon default.
65
The overall widening of the Bid-Ask spread caused by the cost faced by the
dealer for financing the hedges under an asymmetric funding policy amounts to:
UAsk − UBid =FV AAsk + FV ABid
=
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
sBs
(
Vˆ +s + Vˆ
−
s
)
| Gt
]
ds
(2.46)
My line of reasoning can then be summarized in the following remark.
Remark 1 (Bid-Ask spread widening). When the dealer faces an illiquid
own bond market and decides to invest available liquidity at the risk-free rate, it
incurs in instantaneous funding costs widening the bid-ask spread in the amount
of its CDS spread. In the current negative rates environment, risk-free investing
configures as an extra cost for the trading desk, interpretable as a custodial
service price. Nevertheless funding can be used as a tool to evaluate the economic
convenience of entering in derivative trades. In many cases, the optimal entry
price is expected to be different from the fair value.
In current market conditions, BSS funding might be assumed to be partic-
ularly appealing for dealers coping with sufficiently liquid own bond markets.
Without loss of generality, the existence of a liquid own bond market can be
supposed to be common knowledge among market participants. Because of that,
clients are eased in making conjectures about dealers funding requirements. That
might increase clients awareness when bargaining with the counterpart on the
trade price. Charging funding costs to clients is never be fair from a valuation
point of view and, especially in presence of a liquid own bond market, the dealer
is not legitimate to quote an oversized bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, because
of the scarce transparency and high searching costs observed OTC markets,
corporations might be willing to give priority to their economic purposes to book
the trade and pay an unfair bid-ask spread. Therefore as explained in Castagna
(2014), the actual price at which the OTC trades are closed is influenced by the
bargaining power of the two counterparts. As a consequence, upfronts do not
necessary reflect fair prices, which in turn deviate from dealers’ overall valuations,
i.e. those affected by funding costs.
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2.5 Numerical Results
Extending the case study based on the commodity asset class analysed in Chapter
1, the aim of the present numerical application is to quantify experimental
magnitudes of FVA terms and bid-ask spreads widening. The exercise has been
performed in order to verify whether numerical results confirm the theoretical
statements built in previous Sections.
In this Section, I assume that just two possible funding policies are enforceable
by the trading desk of the computing counterpart. In the first case, the trading
desk can put in place the Balance-Sheet Shrinkage by investing the liquidity
coming from the hedging strategy in repurchasing previously issued debt. In such
scenario, the computation leads to what many have called Symmetric Funding
Valuation Adjustment (SFVA), see Albanese et al. (2014). The second scenario
concerns the case in which, for whatever reason, the trading desk decides to
invest liquidity at the risk-free rate. In this case the calculation provides what the
cited Authors have defined Asymmetric Funding Valuation Adjustment (AFVA).
Relying on my line of reasoning, I would expect a null impact on the bid-ask
spread in the first scenario. Conversely, the second one it should configure a
not negligible impact on the bid-ask spread. In order to run the computation,
the idea is to discretize equation 2.37 in the time grid T ≡ {T0, T1, T2, ..., TM},
where t = T0, T = TM = M∆T (m = 0, 1, ...,M) and ∆T = T/M , such that:
FV A '
M−1∑
m=0
EQ[1{τc>Tm,τB>Tm}s
B
Tm VˆTm∆T | GT0 ] (2.47)
A deterministic discount factor has been calibrated by means of the Hull and
White 1 Factor model to the 1 year EURIBOR curve. The discounted funding
spread of Enel has been set to the average of daily 5-years CDS quotes available
in my dataset21, i.e. sBTm = s¯
B ∀m ∈ {0, ..,M}. By exploiting the calibration
of parameters sets and default barriers performed in Chapter 1, joint survival
probabilities have been pre-computed at every each time step of the grid via
Monte Carlo simulations of structural defaults. This set of assumptions allows
me pre-compute joint survival probabilities and drag them and the discounted
funding spread outside the expectation operator22. The expected default risk-
adjusted trade price is then obtained by the same hybrid Fourier-Monte Carlo
algorithm built in Chapter 1.
FV A = s¯B∆T
M−1∑
m=0
Q{τc > Tm, τB > Tm}EQ[VˆTm | FT0 ] (2.48)
21 Source: iTraxx Series for the European CDS market.
22 By factorizing I implicitly assume independence between default processes and discount
factors.
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Counterparty Risk and Funding Valuation Adjustments (XVA)
Contract type V0 CVA/V0 DVA/V0 Vˆ0 FVA/V0 B-A Spread
ATM Call Oil 5.821 15275.381 0 4.932 91.369 0
Forward Oil - 0.032 219.058 124.097 -0.032 108.602 0
Swap Oil -1.375 2.238 113.908 -1.360 88.914 0
ATM Call Gas 0.412 1496.011 0 0.350 91.642 0
Forward Gas -0.027 38.305 169.622 -0.026 - 50.977 0
Swap Gas -0.067 93.757 90.210 -0.067 107.757 0
Tab. 2.1: Case a) Balance-Sheet Shrinkage policy: Symmetric Funding Valuation Ad-
justments, bid-ask spread widening and magnitude comparison with respect
to bilateral CCR adjustments. All relative adjustments are measured in basis
points.
Counterparty Risk and Funding Valuation Adjustments (XVA)
Contract type V0 CVA/V0 DVA/V0 Vˆ0 FVA/V0 B-A Spread
ATM Call Oil 5.821 15275.381 0 4.932 91.345 99.804
Forward Oil - 0.032 219.058 124.097 -0.032 -10.063 - 118.721
Swap Oil -1.375 2.238 113.908 -1.360 88.845 97.074
ATM 1y Call
Gas
0.412 1496.011 0 0.350 91.596 100.079
Forward Gas -0.027 38.305 169.622 -0.026 4.720 55.687
Swap Gas -0.067 93.757 90.210 -0.067 -9.982 -117.766
Tab. 2.2: Case b) Risk-free investing policy. Asymmetric Funding Valuation Adjust-
ments, bid-ask spread widening and magnitude comparison with respect to
bilateral CCR adjustments. All relative adjustments are measured in basis
points.
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It has been considered an ATM Call Option, both Forward and Swap contracts
have been assumed to be negotiated at their respective fair forward and swap
rates. The algorithm has been coded in Python 2.7 on a MacBook Pro Retina
(Late 2013) with 2,4 GHz Intel Core i5 R© processor and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3
RAM. The computation of FVA metrics took roughly 50 minutes for each Call
Option and Forward contract. The algorithm required roughly 3 hours and 30
minutes for calculating the FVA term for single Swap contracts. In both tables it
is displayed the amount of funding costs faced in case of taking a short position
in the trades, i.e. the FV AAsk.
My numerical findings confirm a null impact on the bid-ask spread under
a symmetric funding policy. On the contrary, a considerable effect takes place
when the trading desk pursues an asymmetric funding policy. Except for the
case of one-sided payoff derivatives such as Call Options, in which the CVA-type
term is dominant, the average magnitude of FVAs is relevant and comparable to
those of other XVA terms. In three cases, i.e. for the gas Forward in Table 2.1
(symmetric funding policy) and for the oil Forward and he gas Swap in Table 2.2
(asymmetric funding policy), the FVA terms present negative sign, meaning that
they configure funding benefits. Unexpected results characterize the last two
cases, since the calculation provides a negative overall impact of funding costs on
the bid-ask spread. This occurs because in such cases the FVA involves an overall
cash benefit when taking a back-to-back position in the trade. Nevertheless,
since I do not expect to observe traders quoting negative bid-asks spread to
their clients, the bid-ask widening should revert back to zero, allowing traders
to somehow exploit a kind of funding arbitrage. Exploring the incidence as well
as mechanisms leading traders to gain funding-related profits23 will definitely be
an interesting topic for future research.
Remark 2 (Portfolio effects). As funding strategies are concerned, trading
desks generally put them in place by focusing, for instance, on aggregate liquidity
requirements of portfolios denominated in a given currency. In these regards,
the nonlinear nature of funding costs is exacerbated, meaning that the sum of
stand-alone funding effects at the netting sets level do not equal to the overall
funding effect faced by the desk. As a consequence, within a real application I
would raise some concerns regarding the reliability of a comparative analysis of
the magnitudes of default risk adjustments with respect to those of FVA terms.
2.6 Trading under Central Clearing Counterparties (CCP)
As previously introduced, under the Dodd-Frank Act, Central Clearing Coun-
terparties (CCPs) became mandatory for all OTC inter dealer trades executed
post September 2016 in the US market. In compliance with the EMIR/CRD4,
similar dynamics has been observed in the European market. This involves the
investigation of a new member of the XVA family called Initial Margin Valuation
Adjustment (MVA).
23 That are attainable because of the existence of zero floors for bid-ask spreads characterizing
normal market conditions.
69
It is shared that one of the most effective mitigation practices for default
risk is collateralization. For this reason, regulators are pushing OTC market
participants to move their trading activity under the jurisdiction of CCPs, as it
typically occurs for listed plain vanilla derivatives such as Futures and European-
style Options. The aim of regulators leading to the establishment of compulsory
CCP trading, is to ensure contractual payments of OTC transactions even in case
of default and cover potential losses due to extreme events through an additional
layer of collateralization on top of Variations Margins (VM), represented by the
Initial Margin (IM). This is a cash amount, generally posted to a third custodial
entity or to the CCP itself. The calculation of IM amounts is typically based on
some kind of market risk measure, such as the Stressed Value-at-Risk (SVAR)
or the Expected Shortfall (ES). An alternative is represented by outcome of
suitable Stress Tests, see Green and Kenyon (2014).
In the light of the convenience of financial operators to collaterize exposures
at netting set levels, I would suggest to prefer a coherent subadditive risk measure
such as the Expected Shortfall as a consistent choice for the IM setting. In
fact, the ES has the advantage on top of Value-at-Risk (VaR) of being more
conservative. Moreover, it accounts also for diversification effects arising within
the netting set.
In this Section it is assumed that cash collateral posting is financed through
new debt issuing. As it has been already said, the existence of IM financing costs
led to the birth of an additional member in the XVA family, the MVA. Despite I
believe that MVA does not affect fair valuation as its ”relative” FVA, I fear that
its impact on bid-ask spreads might be even more severe compared to the one
caused by FVAs. This explains why it is rather shared that the establishment of
OTC central cleared trading will impact dramatically on the P&L of OTC trades.
At aggregate level, as TABB Group estimated, the locking of around 2 USD
trillions of dollars in CCPs cash accounts might generate systemic liquidity issues.
Similar insights have been provided by 2013 QIS which reported an impact of
0.7 EUR trillions in the european market. For these reasons, especially for what
concerns corporate firms involved in CCP trading, the efficiency of collateral
management will become a more and more relevant topic in both academic and
operative environments. Moreover, since CPPs can go burst themselves, Central
Clearing poses additional Systemic Risk issues.
Roughly speaking, MVA is the expected cost for financing the Initial Margin
(IM) asked to CCP members. Despite under particular circumstances the FVA
can be mitigated or neglected at all, the IM effect on liquidity is always significant
in terms relative magnitude to the fair value of the contract. Differently from
what it might happen for FVAs, I am afraid that in the case of MVAs no offsetting
effects can materialize. That is the theoretical reason for expecting that the
locking of trillions of dollars of IM into CCPs accounts will cause a systemic
liquidity effect. By incorporating initial margins within the analysis, additional
costs impact on bid-ask spreads that dealers quote to their clients in the amounts
of:
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UAsk − UBid = FV AAsk + FV ABid +MVAAsk +MVABid︸ ︷︷ ︸
IM iquidity Effect
(2.49)
As before, the cost of financing the IM in the case of buying differs from
that in the case of selling, since the MVAAsk and the MVABid are computed
as market risk measures on the opposite sides of the exposure profile:
MVAAsk =
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
s(B,s)ES
Ask
99% | Gt
]
ds
MV ABid =
∫ τ¯
t
EQ
[
s(B,s)ES
Bid
99% | Gt
]
ds
(2.50)
For the sake of simplicity, in this work it is assumed that Initial Margins are
kept fixed and computed at inception as ES risk measures on the single trades.
Unlike the SIMM, I prefer to perform a full revaluation instead of a sensitivity
based estimation. Formally:
ESα(Φ(Sth)) = EQ [Φ(Sth) | Φ(Sth) ≤ V aRα(Φ(Sth))] = 1
α
∫ α
0
V aRγ(Φ(Sth))dγ
(2.51)
where
V aRα(Φ(Sth)) = inf{x ∈ IR+ | Q{Φ(Sth) + x ≤ 0} ≥ 1− α} (2.52)
I denote by V aRα the Value-at-Risk at α confidence level, here set at the
99% (in line with SIMM), while th indicates the time-horizon, here equal one
week Margin Period of Risk. Within my theoretical framework, since I am
computing the risk measure for pricing purposes, the numerical calculation of
the Expected Shortfall measures is performed via a Monte Carlo Simulation
under the risk-neutral pricing probability measure Q.
Initial Margins and MVA
Contract type V0 IMAsk IMBid MVA/V0 B-A Spread
ATM 1y Call Oil 5.821 0.140 0 240.446 240.446
ATM 1y Call Gas 0.417 0.011 0 255.764 255.764
Tab. 2.3: MVA liquidity effect arising from the Initial Margins financing cost. All
relative adjustments are measured in basis points.
As shown in Table 2.3, my expectations regarding MVA terms are confirmed:
their contribution to the bid-ask spread widening is quite relevant. MVA compo-
nents are larger than FVA components in terms of magnitude, and unfortunately
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”offsetting effect” can materialize under whatever funding policy undertaken by
the trader. In fact, the symmetry of the funding policy does not matter in this
context, since under CCP clearing24 initial margins always configure as cash
outflows. Table 2.3 displays the relative magnitude of MVA terms only for the
Call Options since the value at inception of the analysed Forward and Swap
contracts is virtually null. My numerical results show that the relative size of
MVA as a fraction of the initial default-free derivative price reaches significant
levels. Being Call Options one-sided derivatives, the IM required by the CCP is
positive in the case of selling and null in the case of buying. According to my
numerical results, the liquidity effect arising from financing the additional IM
funding cost is material: its relative magnitude ranges around the 2.4%/2.55% of
the initial fair value of the default-free derivative, making the MVA comparable
or even bigger in some circumstances than other XVA family members.
From a theoretical point of view, my belief is that forcing market participants
at trading under CCPs and posting Initial Margins grounded on market risk
measures over unsecured exposures, poses the threat of a not negligible degree of
overlap with the FVA term. In fact, assuming OTC trades are at least partially
hedged (in the majority of cases they are fully hedged via back-to-back policies),
some FVA costs have to be financed. In such scenario if the trader, in order to
not record a loss on the deal, is forced to charge the counterpart at least the
sum of FVAs and the MVAs via some bid-ask spread widening. In my opinion,
a critical theoretical inconsistency might reside in that hedging could not be
recognized when computing the initial margin through market risk measures.
As a consequence, the counterpart is asked to pay two partially overlapping
costs, the FVA and the MVA. In other words, the client would be asked to
pay both the price of overall risk seen at the outset and the cost for hedging it
out. The acknowledgement of such threat might represent a further signal of
the uncontrolled behaviour which OTC derivatives prices might show under the
current enlargement of the XVA family. The classical Law of the Unique Price
risks to be broken in a not reversible way. In the light of these arguments, I
expect that the topic of the FVA/MVA overlap could become more and more
investigated by both the practitioners and academic research.
2.7 Conclusions
By starting the analysis of funding costs from a reversed perspective with respect
to the usual one in literature, instead of including funding-related cash flows
within the derivative payoff, I firstly aimed at understanding the economic role
played by the FVA term. The FVA effect is dealer-specific, meaning that it is
roughly proportional to the CDS spread of the computing party and dependent
on the measure by which the dealer itself decides to hedge out the overall risk.
The inclusion of the Funding Valuation Adjustments (FVA) in fair pricing would
break the symmetrical nature of derivative prices. Furthermore, as the negative
24 On the contrary, if IM is posted in the context of SCSA it might take place an offsetting
effect similar to that observed for the FVA.
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part of the FVA term is concerned (i.e. when funding provides positive cash
flows), it involves some degree of overlap with the DVA term. The inclusion in
pricing of FVA benefits would force the dealer to pay twice the price of its own
default risk. As a consequence, I conclude that there is no theoretical reason for
including funding costs within fair pricing principles.
Nevertheless, in a shareholders utility maximization perspective, FVA man-
agement can to be used as an internal tool of profitability analysis. I have found
that funding costs are responsible of a widening in the bid-ask spread that dealers
typically quote to their OTC clients. Such widening is exactly equal to the
sum of the FVA costs faced in the cases of going long and short into the trade.
One of the most relevant achievements of the present work, is to underline that
under symmetric funding policies (for instance the Balance-Sheet Shrinkage),
there configures an offsetting effect which drives the bid-ask spread widening
to zero. Such a result extends the vanishment of funding effects introduced by
Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) in the case of no haircut, to the more general scenario
of symmetrical funding policies. Moreover in the current financial landscape,
characterized by negative short-term nearly risk-free rates, BSS is probably the
optimal choice for dealers coping with a liquid own bond market.
It has been performed a numerical application, which relies on the structural
first-passage time default framework built in Chapter 1. The calculation involves
a hybrid procedure in which the exposures upon defaults are computed by means
of the Fourier Cosine Series (COS) method, while default processes are simulated
via a joint Monte Carlo simulation. When the BSS is in place, numerical results
confirm my theoretical expectations of null bid-ask spread widening. On the
other hand, when symmetric funding policies are not attainable, the impact in
the bid-ask spread is relevant and comparable in terms of magnitude, to other
XVA terms. Assuming the existence of a liquid own bond market for the dealer
as common knowledge among market participants increases the client awareness
during the bargain with the counterpart. Nevertheless, in the reality the actual
entry price of OTC derivative trades often depends on the bargaining power of
the two counterparts.
Being discounted funding costs roughly proportional to CDS spreads, FVAs
could represent a factor which raises markets efficiency: if the derivative contract
represents a predominant asset and the bank A finances itself by paying the double
of the credit spread of the bank B, it would incur in the double of the funding cost
faced by the bank B. Although it seems not to be the case, in a frictionless and
competitive market, the bank B would have an advantage in winning the trade.
Otherwise, if the derivative represents a predominant liability, the opposite holds
since funding benefits, interpreted as savings in terms of unsecured borrowing
repayments, are larger for the bank A. However as previously stated, OTC
markets are rather affected by frictions such as transaction and searching costs,
opaqueness and, last but not least, market power. All these factors could prevent
the achievement of a competitive equilibrium in which OTC trades are booked
at the fair value.
In Section 2.6 it has been discussed the topic of the additional layer of
collateralization represented by Initial Margins, requested when trading under
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Central Clearing Counterparts (CCP). Within my numerical application, it has
been shown how the Initial Margin Valuation Adjustments (MVA) liquidity effect
on the bid-ask spread is quite relevant. I observed the MVA effect being bigger
the one caused by the FVA, which conceptually is its closest relative within the
XVA family. Moreover, since IM are computed as market risk measures, such
as the Expected Shortfall, no offsetting effect can materialize under whatever
funding policy carried out by the trader. Since the ES itself might not recognize
the hedging, the counterpart could face the risk to be charged two potentially
overlapping costs, the FVA and the MVA. In the light of the relevance of such
argument, I expect that the investigation of the degree of overlap between funding
and IM margining will attract the attention of regulators, practitioners and the
academic researchers. Further developments on the topic might relate to the
inclusion within the picture of the relationships between IM margining costs and
Netting.
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3. MODEL EXTENSIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
ABSTRACT
The aim of the present Chapter is to improve of the structural first-passage
framework built in Chapter 1 along several directions as well as test its robustness.
Since typically commodity trades are not clearable under Central Clearing
Counterparts (CCPs), it is worthy to assess the effect of bilateral Collateral
Support Annex (CSA) agreements on CVA/DVA metrics. Moreover I introduce
within my CCR modelling, the impact of state-dependent stochastic recovery
rates. Furthermore, in order to stress-test my framework, I investigate the effects
on CCR measures of multiplicative shocks to the two major drivers in the game:
credit and volatility. Finally I propose an alternative balance-sheet calibration
based on hybrid market/accounting data which is well suited in the commodity
context in the light of small and medium size of corporations usually operating
in the EU commodity derivatives market for risk-management purposes.
Keywords: CCR Metrics, First-Passage Models, Energy Commodities, Collat-
eral, Sensitivity Analysis, Stress Testing, Recovery Risk, Accounting Data.
3.1 Introduction
The aim of the present Chapter is to extend and stress test the first-passage
structural Le`vy model built in Chapter 1 in order to allow for contractual
provisions often agreed in practise, for instance bilateral collateral margining.
Counterparts negotiating OTC derivative trades often agree on bilateral collat-
eralization within the Collateral Support Annex (CSA) since, in many cases, it
is the most effective way to mitigate the Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR). Such
agreements might oblige the two counterparts to obey to standard rather than
more exotic provisions. In particular, commodity transactions are practically
not clearable under Central Clearing Counterparts (CPPs), so that they require
tailored agreements between the parties involved in the trade. Nevertheless,
although the effectiveness of the use of collateral in mitigating the CCR is
conceptually convincing and supported by the empirical evidence, it presents the
major drawback of being costly for the business. Especially for both medium
and small corporate firms, posting the cash available from the balance-sheet
to secure their derivative transactions might expose them to critical issues of
collateral management. The cost for financing collateral margining interacts
largely with other funding costs, as it partially offsets the cost for hedging
unsecured exposures1.
The Recovery Risk comes into the picture when acknowledging that real
world recovery rates are stochastic themselves. Unfortunately, stochastic recovery
rates are scarcely modellable risk drivers. This evidence derives from the lack
of data on corporate recovery rates upon defaults. Recoveries are absolutely
relevant in terms of relative weight for the calculation of the XVA metrics, since
a deviation of the predicted recovery rate from the actual one upon default can
compromise the accuracy even of a sophisticated model. Strangely, Recovery
Risk has not been so far a popular topic within available CCR literature.
A stress test of my model is required in order to assess how much the valuation
adjustments are sensitive to shocks impacting on the main underlying risk drivers,
i.e. credit and volatility. Furthermore the analysis of CDS and Vega sensitivities,
among others, could drive CCR hedging strategies. At first glance, within my
theoretical framework CDS credit shocks impact on the calibration of the Normal
Inverse Gaussian (NIG) processes as well as on that of the default barriers of
the two firms. As a consequence, CDS credit shocks influence also the CVA and
DVA measures computed through my hybrid Fourier-Monte Carlo framework.
As volatility shocks are concerned, since they are exogenously set to the vectors
of optimal parameters, they affect directly on the calculation of CVAs and DVAs.
My reason for assessing an alternative hybrid market-accounting calibration
is in some way provocative. It derives from a well known risk in Economics,
called self-fulfilling prophecies, which might apply also in the context of XVA
pricing. On the other hand, relying on balance-sheet data might be necessary
in the case of trading OTC derivative claims against counterparts lacking CDS
quotations. Such scenario is often observed in the EU commodities market.
1 See Chapter 2, Section 3.
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3.1.1 Main contributions
I have extended my Monte Carlo framework by comparing the effectiveness of
two different CSA collateralization schemes in terms of reduction of the ”pure”
CCR metrics, i.e. the CVA and the DVA. Another relevant contribution of the
present Chapter consists in my attempt to model state-dependent stochastic
recovery rates since, from a theoretical point of view, recoveries should be related
to the severity of occurred defaults. For that purpose, I make use of a well known
tool coming from the Recovery Risk literature: the Beta distribution, see Chen
and Wang (2013). Furthermore, a Sensitivity Analysis has been performed in
order to assess how the output of the model reacts to changes in the calibration
coming from multiplicative shocks to the two major drivers in the game: credit
and volatility. As I will show in the following, through the Sensitivity Analysis
some interesting asymptotic behaviours of the CCR measures have emerged.
My last contribution is the suggestion of an alternative choice for calibration
benchmarks. My proposal consists in tuning the Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG)
parameters sets to the prices of liquid securities, such as European Options,
while estimating the default barriers from publicly available balance-sheet data.
My goal is to put light on whether accounting data provide different information
on creditworthiness with respect to that implied in the CDS market.
The Chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 I compare the effectiveness
of two different CSA collateral schemes. Section 3.3 describes my modelling
approach to state-dependent stochastic recovery rates. In Section 3.4 I perform a
Sensitivity Analysis with respect to credit and volatility. Section 3.5 provides the
results arising out of the alternative balance-sheet based calibration procedure.
Section 3.6 draws the conclusive remarks of the present Chapter and suggests
some ideas for future research on the topic.
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3.2 The effects of CSA collateral agreements
It is widely shared that collateral is main driver for the purpose of mitigating
CCR risk. Nevertheless collateral posting is costly and involves critical treasury
issues similar to those found in the context of FVAs. Especially for corporate
firms, funding the cash collateral required in order to secure OTC derivatives
might be out of their scope given the non financial nature of their business.
The ISDA (2002) Master Agreement provides standard Collateral Support
Annex (CSA) guidelines, which however might be customized by the parties
involved in the trade. In this Section I set up a numerical study in order to
compare the effectiveness of two different CSA schemes in mitigating the size of
bilateral CCR metrics. In both cases I assume that the amount of collateral to
be posted at each margining date is computed on the basis of the default-free
value of the derivative Vt−1 as in the previous step of the Monte Carlo simulation.
Since in my calculation engine I configure 48 time steps per year, the Margin
Period of Risk2 equals to one week.
CSA scheme 1: Predetermined partial collateralization. As a
first scheme I consider the case in which at any margining date, the cash
collateral amount is set as a fraction α of the default-free value of the derivative
Vt−1 computed in the previous step of the simulation:
Ct = αVt−1 (3.1)
As a consequence, the actual unsecured exposure faced by the in the money
counterpart at time t equals to:
t =Vt − Ct
=Vt − αVt−1
(3.2)
My choice is to set α = 50%.
CSA scheme 2: Full collateralization above a fixed threshold. As
a second scheme let me consider the case in which at any margining date, the cash
collateral amount is such that there configures a cap, equal to a predetermined
threshold T , to the maximum unsecured exposure faced by the in the money
counterpart. In other words, I assume that if the value of the derivative Vt−1 at
the previous step in the Monte Carlo simulation is greater than the threshold,
the excess exposure is fully collaterized:
Ct = (Vt−1 − T )1{Vt−1>T} (3.3)
2 By definition, the Margin Period of Risk denotes the amount of time during which, even
under full collateralization, the in the money counterpart faces the risk to incur in some losses
upon default as a consequence of unfavorable prices movements meanwhile occurred.
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As a consequence, the actual unsecured exposure faced by the in the money
counterpart at time t equals to:
t =Vt − Ct
=Vt − (Vt−1 − T )1{Vt−1>T}
(3.4)
In the present numerical application I have set the threshold T to the 50%
of the default-free value of the trade at the outset, i.e. T = 0.5V0. No Minimum
Transfer Amount (MTA) has been assumed.
The next step involved the recalculation of both the CVAs and DVAs for
some trades in order to assess which one, among the two CSA schemes, is more
effective in mitigating the CCR risk.
Counterparty Credit Risk Valuation Adjustments
Contract type V0 CVA CVA/V0 DVA DVA/V0 Vˆ0
ATM Call Oil 5.82103 0.43051 739.578 0 0 5.39052
Forward Oil -0.31709 0.00320 100.774 0.00549 173.255 -0.31479
Swap Oil -1.37521 0.00021 1.550 0.02379 172.989 -1.35164
Tab. 3.1: CVAs and DVAs for different derivative claims issued on crude oil in presence
of the CSA Scheme 1. Relative valuation adjustments are expressed in basis
points.
Counterparty Credit Risk Valuation Adjustments
Contract type V0 CVA CVA/V0 DVA DVA/V0 Vˆ0
ATM Call Oil 5.82103 0.36982 635.324 0 0 5.45121
Forward Oil -0.31709 0.00407 128.366 0.00395 124.685 -0.31720
Swap Oil -1.37521 0 0 0.01397 101.586 -1.36124
Tab. 3.2: CVAs and DVAs for different derivative claims issued on crude oil in presence
of the CSA Scheme 2. Relative valuation adjustments are expressed in basis
points
By looking at Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, it is possible to state that in general
both the two analysed CSA schemes are effective in decreasing the CVAs signifi-
cantly. As the European Option and the Swap are concerned, the CSA scheme 2
performs better than the competitor. On the contrary, my empirical findings
display a larger reduction of the CVA of the Forward under the CSA scheme 1.
On the DVA side, the CSA scheme 1 fails in mitigating the valuation adjustment
for own default risk, while the CSA scheme 2 successes in reducing the DVA just
in the case of the Swap.
In conclusion I have found that, under the usual number of Monte Carlo
iterations (i.e 10,000), the introduction of the CSA scheme 2 causes an increase
in the variance of both CVA and DVA results. In other words, CSA scheme 2 is
responsible of a shrinkage of the stability of my results.
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3.3 Incorporating state-dependent stochastic recovery rates
Although Recovery Risk should be quiet a debated topic in the context of CCR,
since a deviation of the actual recovery rate upon default from the expected one
can compromise the accuracy even of a sophisticated model, stochastic recoveries
have been scarcely investigated in the CCR literature. Despite the scarcity
of research on the topic, some insights can be found in Cre´pey (2015b) who
modelled recovery rates as G-adapted stochastic processes.
A quantitative approach for modelling stochastic recovery rates can start by
assuming an explicit statistical distribution of the overall recovery rate upon the
bankruptcy of the company. Actually, in real market conditions the recovery rate
is not homogeneous among the claims issued by the defaulted company: more
precisely, the holders of senior bonds or other secured instruments have priority
in collecting their credits during the liquidation process. As a consequence, in
comparison with junior creditors, they are likely to claim an higher fraction of
the distressed assets of the defaulted company.
Among several distributions available in literature, the Beta distribution B
has been widely preferred in order to model stochastic recoveries, since it is a
continuous distribution taking values the interval [0, 1]3 Furthermore, the Beta
distribution allows for useful features such as skewness and excess kurtosis. The
Beta distribution is specified by two non negative parameters α and β such that
its probability density function (PDF) reads:
f(x) =
xα−1(1− x)β−1
B(α, β)
(3.5)
where the Beta function B(α, β) is defined as:
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
xα−1(1− x)β−1dx
As concerns the location and scale parameters, in the case of a Beta random
variable X ∼ B(α, β), they equal to:
E[X] =
α
α+ β
(3.6)
and
Var[X] =
αβ
(α+ β)2 + (α+ β + 1)
(3.7)
I aim to relate the forecast of stochastic recovery rates to the severity of
credit events. In fact, my idea is to model the stochastic recovery as dependent
on the relative Gaussian distance of the equity value upon default with respect
to the default trigger K. Let me define the random variable ξτ¯ = f(Sτ¯ ) as:
ξτ¯ =
φK,1(Sτ¯ )
φK,1(K)
(3.8)
3 Such domain is consistent with admissible values for recovery rates.
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where φK,1 is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a Normal
distribution with mean K and unitary variance.
The stochastic recovery rate is therefore defined as the inverse CDF of a Beta
distribution B(α∗, β∗) calculated in ξτ¯ :
Rτ¯ = B
−1
(α∗,β∗)(ξτ¯ ) (3.9)
This model setup makes the stochastic recovery state-dependent : in other
words, the way the algorithm samples from the properly parametrized Beta
distribution B(α∗, β∗) depends on how much the equity value upon default is
below the barrier.
In my numerical study, I have calibrated the parameters (α, β) in order to
set up a prior Beta distribution B characterized by small variance and centered
in the historical average of corporate recovery rates of 40%. As a consequence,
the Beta optimal parameters are:
α∗ = 10.46464464, β∗ = 15.69696695
The model-independent formula for bilateral CCR adjustments built in
Chapter 1 incorporating the Recovery Risk modifies to:
Vˆt = Vt
− EQ[1{τ=τC}D(t, τC)(1−B−1(α∗,β∗)(ξCτC ))V +τC | Gt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CV A
+ EQ[1{τ=τB}D(t, τB)(1−B−1(α∗,β∗)(ξBτB ))V −τB | Gt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DVA
(3.10)
For the sake of self-consistency of the present Section, I remark that EQ
denotes the risk-neutral expectation under some pricing measure Q, conditional
to the global filtration Gt which include all market information and default
history up to time t. Vt denotes the default-free value of the contract and D is
the risk-free discount factor4. The CVA and DVA acronyms stand respectively
for Credit Valuation Adjustment and Debt Valuation Adjustment.
The below Table 3.3 shows the results for bilateral Counterparty Credit
Risk adjustments computed trough the usual hybrid Fourier-Monte Carlo model,
extended in order to allow for state-dependent recovery rates upon default. At
the same time, in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 it is shown the degree of fitting of the
stochastic recoveries experimental frequencies of both the firms with respect
to the theoretical limit Beta distribution B(α∗,β∗). As it is shown in the two
figures and by the descriptive statistics relative to case of the European Call
Option issued on natural gas (listed in Table 3.4), the way how my algorithm
samples from the Beta distribution is not centered in the theoretical mean but is
state-dependent, as it is influenced by the actual severity of simulated defaults.
4 Under the independence hypothesis, the risk-free discount factor can be dragged out
from the expectation and equals to the price of a zero-coupon bond, i.e. D(0, t) =
EQ
[
exp
(
− ∫ t0 rsds)]. r is proxied by the Eonia/EURIBOR rates.
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Counterparty Credit Risk Valuation Adjustments
Contract type V0 CVA CVA/V0 DVA DVA/V0 Vˆ0
ATM Call Oil 5.82103 0.93075 1598.940 0 0 4.89028
ATM Call Gas 0.41155 0.06477 1573.876 0 0 0.34677
Tab. 3.3: CVAs and DVAs for the ATM European Call Options issued on crude oil
and natural gas incorporating the state-dependent stochastic recovery rates.
Relative valuation adjustments are expressed in basis points.
In fact as shown by Table 3.4, the average stochastic recoveries are 58%
and 36% for Enel and BNP Paribas, respectively. I argue that these results are
ultimately driven by the volatility, which is higher for the financial firm. For this
reason, the relative Gaussian distance of the equity values upon default from
the trigging barrier is on average larger for BNP Paribas. That clearly impacts
also on the bilateral CCR metrics (and in particular on the CVA, since I am
here considering one-sided payoff derivatives), which are higher if compared with
those computed assuming deterministic recovery rates equal to the historical
average of 40%, see Session 1.4.3. I can therefore conclude that, by neglecting the
role of volatility and setting flat recoveries for all firms, in certain circumstances
there configures some risk overestimation, as in the case of Enel. Conversely in
other circumstances, there configures some risk underestimation, as in the case
of BNP Paribas. The degree of missing risk can be severe and might vanish the
accuracy even of a sophisticated model. For this reason even if one decides to
adopt deterministic recoveries, I would suggest to efficiently manage the Recovery
Risk by carrying out an ex-ante study of volatilities before setting static recovery
rates.
Stochastic Recoveries Descriptive Statistics
Firm Min Max Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Enel 0.47762 0.78154 0.58083 0.00218 0.69119 0.59477
BNP Paribas 0.01008 0.72569 0.36009 0.01390 0.02283 -0.38029
Tab. 3.4: Descriptive statistics of the experimental recovery rates relative to the simula-
tion for the computation of the CCR measures of the European Call Option
issued on natural gas.
As a conclusive example, as shown in Figure 3.3, by assuming a negative 25%
multiplicative shock on BNP Paribas volatility, the experimental frequencies of
stochastic recovery rates of the financial firm fit quiet accurately the limit Beta
distribution B(α∗,β∗). Such evidence suggests that a deterministic 40% recovery
is appropriate in presence of that relaxed level of BNP volatility, and not for the
real-world one. Nevertheless, in such a low volatility scenario, the CVA would
reduce at just the 7.07% of the initial default-free value of the European Call
Option issued on natural gas. Such a massive reduction is clearly not realistic. In
the light of my experimental evidences it seems that state-dependent stochastic
recoveries are characterized by some Leverage Effect with respect to volatility:
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Fig. 3.1: Simulated distribution of Enel recovery rates under the baseline calibration.
Fig. 3.2: Simulated distribution of BNP Paribas recovery rates under the baseline
calibration.
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Fig. 3.3: Simulated distribution of BNP Paribas recovery rates in case of a negative
25% shock on volatility.
small mistakes in setting static recoveries imply large deviation from the actual
implied volatilities.
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3.4 Sensitivity Analysis on credit and volatility
In order to stress test my framework, the present Section describes a sensitivity
analysis performed by applying multiplicative shocks to the two major drivers
in the picture, i.e. credit and volatility. I aim to assess how my hybrid Fourier-
Monte Carlo model reacts conditionally to variations of one relevant parameter,
ceteris paribus.
As credit concerned, I assume parallel multiplicative shocks to the CDS
quotes used as benchmarks in calibration of the Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG)
optimal parameters of both firms by means of the Fourier Cosine Series (COS)
pricing formula for CDS explained in details in Subsection 1.4.2. The below
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 display the behaviour of the several parameters with respect
to variable CDS credit shocks on both Enel and BNP Paribas. The excess
kurtosis parameters κi of the two NIG processes, together with the barrier level,
appear to be those which react in a more predictable way, i.e. by increasing
when the multiplicative shocks grow, and viceversa. This happens especially in
the calibration of the financial firm parameters. Nevertheless, no calibration in
general seems to be affected so sharply, as shown by the ambiguous paths drawn
in the two Figures.
Fig. 3.4: Sensitivity to multiplicative CDS credit shocks of Enel calibrated parameters.
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Fig. 3.5: Sensitivity to multiplicative CDS credit shocks of BNP Paribas calibrated
parameters.
Sensitivity Analysis to CDS Credit Shocks
Shock type V0 CVA CVA/V0 DVA DVA/V0 Vˆ0
-40% CDS Shock 5.82103 0.88492 1520.206 0 0 4.93611
-25% CDS Shock 5.82103 0.91272 1567.975 0 0 4.90831
-10% CDS Shock 5.82103 0.91312 1568.649 0 0 4.90792
+10% CDS Shock 5.82103 0.86501 1486.010 0 0 4.95602
+25% CDS Shock 5.82103 0.90137 1548.463 0 0 4.91967
+40% CDS Shock 5.82103 1.09750 1885.401 0 0 4.72353
Tab. 3.5: Sensitivity Analysis on the CVA of an ATM European Option issued on
crude oil with respect to parallel CDS credit shocks to both firms. Relative
valuation adjustments are expressed in basis points.
CVA Sensitivity Analysis to Volatility Shocks
Shock -40% -25% -10% 10% 25% 40%
CVA 0.01% 3.06% 3.10% -2.29% 1.83% 19.38%
Tab. 3.6: CDS credit sensitivities with respect to the base scenario of the CVA of an
ATM European Call Option issued on crude oil given parallel CDS shocks to
both firms.
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Fig. 3.6: Sensitivity of the Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) on an ATM European
Call Option with respect to CDS credit shocks
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Figure 3.6 shows that even if the sensitivity with respect to CDS credit shocks
does follow an increasing trend, it is clear that the CVA on the European ATM
Call Option on crude oil reacts significantly just in the positive 40% CDS credit
shock case.
As volatility is concerned, through a similar procedure to that applied to
credit, I have assumed multiplicative shocks impacting on both the σi parameters
of the two firms calibrated in the base scenario. It can be argued that the impact
of volatility shocks on the bilateral CCR metrics is in general significant in
terms of magnitude. Nevertheless, volatility shocks fail in reaching the peak
of 19.38% CVA sensitivity registered in correspondence of parallel 40% CDS
shocks. Furthermore, the patterns of CDS and Vega sensitivities are significantly
different. Interestingly, for both the CVA and DVA computed on a Forward
contract issued on crude oil, Vega sensitivities exhibit an asymmetric behaviour,
since they are much more reactive in the case of negative volatility shocks in
comparison with positive ones. In my numerical simulation, while the two CCR
measures shrink significantly as a consequence of negative volatility shocks, the
Vega sensitivities of the two metrics seem to display a limited increase as a
consequence of positive volatility shocks. Such experimental evidence might
suggest the existence of an upper bound for both the bilateral CCR adjustments.
Sensitivity Analysis to Volatility Shocks
Shock type V0 CVA CVA/V0 DVA DVA/V0 Vˆ0
-40% Vol Shock -0.31709 0.00083 26.109 0.00113 35.728 -0.31678
-25% Vol Shock -0.31709 0.00208 65.686 0.00212 66.867 -0.31705
-10% Vol Shock -0.31709 0.00406 126.958 0.00297 93.635 0.31814
+10% Vol Shock -0.31709 0.01017 320.731 0.00503 158.723 -0.32223
+25% Vol Shock -0.31709 0.01478 466.005 0.00589 185.909 -0.32597
+40% Vol Shock -0.31709 0.01991 627.813 0.00538 169.595 -0.33162
Tab. 3.7: Sensitivity Analysis of the CVA on a Forward contract issued on crude oil
with respect to parallel volatility shocks to both firms. Relative valuation
adjustments are expressed in basis points.
Vega Sensitivity Analysis to Volatility Shocks
Shock -40% -25% -10% 10% 25% 40%
CVA -7.39% -2.33% -0.73% 0.32% 0.53% 0.65%
DVA -2.47% -0.86% -0.33% 0.22% 0.33% 0.27%
Tab. 3.8: Vega sensitivities with respect to the base scenario of the CVA and DVA on a
Forward contract issued on crude oil given parallel volatility shocks to both
firms. Relative valuation adjustments are expressed in basis points.
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Fig. 3.7: Vega sensitivities of the Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) and Debt Val-
uation Adjustment (DVA) on a Forward contract issued on crude oil with
respect to volatility shocks to both firms.
90
3.5 Exogenous balance-sheet based default barriers
In both industrial and academic application, survival and default probabilities are
calibrated to those implied in the CDS market. Since such products provide pro-
tection against the default of a given reference entity, it is absolutely respectable
to believe that CDS contain genuine information about the creditworthiness of a
reference entity. CDS contracts are indeed strongly recommended by the Basel
III regime to be used as a key tool for CCR mitigation.
As a drawback, it might exist the risk of making the output of different
methodological approaches aligned to the same benchmarks. Therefore, even if
a structural modelling of default events is adopted, there should be no reason
to expect different results compared to those obtainable by a reduced-form
model. The reason is that all those frameworks are calibrated in order to the key
elements of the calculation, i.e. survival and default probabilities, to that implied
in the market. Of course, this way of reasoning might be applied asymptotically
to all financial applications and not just to the CCR. That would violate the
shareable need to rely on a reference price through which to evaluate whether
the output of a model is economically credible or not.
My point is that such issue is even worse in the case of CDS, since the
quotes displayed by major data providers typically rely on well defined modelling
choices, regarding the definition of credit events, hedging portfolios, discount
curves. Moreover, CDS contracts are less accessible than plain vanilla derivatives
because: 1) they are negotiated OTC 2) they are more complex in terms of
conventions that might be customized in real transactions 3) they are poorly
liquid for many maturities (except for the 5 years one) and last but not least, 4)
they are not available for many reference names.
In the light of these arguments, especially within a structural approach, an
alternative and economically sounding experiment could be calibrating model
parameters by the use of some balance-sheet data albeit, how authoritatively
argued by Brigo et al. (2011), these as well are affected by a high degree of
uncertainty. One first attempt to rely on accounting data could be to access
to the last published balance-sheets data5 and exploit a particularly successful
practical implementation of structural credit modelling, i.e. the KMV6 approach.
In a nutshell, the KMV model puts the barrier somewhere in between the face
value of short term liabilities, and the face value of the total liabilities, arguing
that the firm is strictly forced to service short term debt, but it can be more
flexible in servicing long term repayments. Because of that within the KMV
approach the default trigger is given by the sum of the full short term liabilities
and the half of the long term liabilities. In the present Section, the KMV
approach has been used for calibrating the barrier levels to balance-sheet data.
NIG parameters instead, have been tuned to liquid option prices.
5 Source: https://it.finance.yahoo.com
6 The firm KMV is named after Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek, the founders of the
company in 2002. It has then been sold to Moody’s.
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Alternative calibration results
NIG processes Barrier κ∗ θ∗ σ∗ RMSE
Enel 0.27956 0.22369 -0.22369 0.20034 0.19305
BNP Paribas 0.76174 0.80464 -0.18519 0.14148 0.19305
Tab. 3.9: Calibration results based on the KMV approach for barrier levels and on
European Call Options for NIG parameters.
As shown in Table 3.9, given the very high level of indebtedness of BNP
Paribas emerging from its accounting data, the default trigger is set at about
the 76% of its equity value at the outset. Albeit its level of volatility is lower in
comparison with the one calibrated under the CDS-based case, I would expect
that BNP is likely to default before Enel.
Alternative Counterparty Credit Risk Valuation Adjustments
Contract type V0 CVA CVA/V0 DVA DVA/V0 Vˆ0
ATM Call Oil 5.82103 1.78212 3061.527 0 0 4.03890
Swap Gas 0.06716 0.00118 175.092 0 0 0.06598
Tab. 3.10: Recomputed CVAs and DVAs according to the alternative hybrid mar-
ket/balance sheet calibration.
Table 3.10 displays the results for the recomputed CCR metrics relative to a
subset of the initial basket of energy commodity derivatives. For both an ATM
European Call Option issued on crude oil and a Forward contract issued on
natural gas, the effect of incorporating the alternative KMV-type calibration
is the avoidance of any kind of DVA benefit for Enel since the financial firm,
in the light of its accounting data, defaults first in all the scenarios, making its
experimental first-to-default probability within one year jumping to about 41%.
As a consequence, CVA for Enel in both trades had roughly doubled.
The major issue of such a hybrid market-accounting calibration relates to
the fact that securities are priced under a suitable risk-neutral probability
measure, while accounting data are historical. This evidence makes them hardly
comparable. In this context, ways to overcome such limitation might gain the
interest of future research.
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3.6 Conclusions
In the present Section, I draw some conclusive remarks regarding the several
model extensions and the Sensitivity Analysis performed within the Chapter. In
Section 3.2 it has been compared the impact of two different CSA schemes in
mitigating the bilateral Counterparty Credit Risk metrics. Even if both the two
schemes are effective in terms of CVA reduction, the full collateralization above
a fixed threshold appears to be superior. On the contrary, the two schemes do
not expose the same capability in reducing the DVA. Unfortunately I noticed
that under the CSA scheme 2, at the usual number of Monte Carlo iterations (i.e.
10,000), the stability of results is lowered. Nevertheless being the computational
time limited, it is sufficient to increase the number of simulations in order to
reach the desired level of accuracy.
In order to investigate the Recovery Risk, in Section 3.3 it have been modelled
state-dependent stochastic recovery rates. In other words, recovery rates have
been related to the severity of defaults occurred, measured in terms of relative
Gaussian distance. My experimental findings demonstrate that, even assuming
a common Beta random variable centered in the historical average of corporate
recovery rates as theoretical limit distribution, the sampling is significantly
dependent on the volatility parameter of the analysed firm. As a consequence,
in some cases assuming flat deterministic recoveries of 40% configures as a risk
overestimation while in other cases it configures some degree of missing risk.
Because of that, even if the use of deterministic recovery rates if preferred
or necessary on daily basis, I would suggest to perform an ex-ante volatility
assessment. In the light of my experimental evidences it seems that state-
dependent stochastic recoveries are characterized by some Leverage Effect with
respect to volatility: small mistakes in setting static recoveries imply large
deviation from the actual implied volatilities.
For the purpose of stress testing my framework, in Section 3.4 it has been
carried out a Sensitivity Analysis on the size bilateral CCR adjustments with
respect to multiplicative shocks to the two major drivers in the picture, i.e.
credit and volatility. In the first step, it have been applied both positive and
negative shocks to listed CDS quotes of both the two firms. In the light of that,
NIG parameters and barrier levels have been recalibrated by means of the COS
formula for CDS. The impact on the overall calibration revealed to be quiet
ambiguous except for the barrier levels and the excess kurtosis parameters κi,
which, especially in the case of BNP Paribas, appeared to be more reactive
to CDS credit shocks. The largest credit sensitivity has been registered in
correspondence of quite high positive CDS shocks, which caused a 20% increase
of the CVA on the European Call Option issued on crude oil. As volatility is
concerned, in the case of a Forward contract issued on crude oil, my numerical
analysis shows that in general both the CVA and DVA Vega sensitivities are
significant. Interestingly, I noted an asymmetric behaviour of Vega sensitivities
with respect to negative rather then positive volatility shocks. Both the CVA
and the DVA displayed a large reduction in case of negative volatility shocks
while they showed a limited growth in correspondence of positive ones. Such an
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evidence might suggest the existence of an empirical upper bound to the Vega
sensitivities of the bilateral CCR adjustments.
Relatively to the alternative balance-sheet based KMV-type calibration
proposed in Section 3.5, the results for CVAs are roughly doubled while the
DVAs are null, since the financial firm is much more risky than the corporate firm
according to the KMV approach. This huge difference in the creditworthiness
announced by accounting data is not reflected in the CDS market and might
be imputable to different accounting conventions used within different sectors
of the economy. Another explanation might reside in the objective difficulty in
evaluating some financial assets and liabilities. This limitation could make us
doubters regarding the reliability of balance-sheet data but it still represents an
initial attempt to relate XVAs numerical computations to economic fundamentals.
Further work have to be carried out in order to investigate more deeply
topics of relevant interest for both the academic and industrial research such
as the social cost of clearing OTC trades under CCPs, the issue of collateral
management with a particular focus on non financial institutions, the impact on
OTC derivatives valuation of the (K)apital Valuation Adjustment (KVA) and
the role played by second order cross-sensitivities even in the context of CCR
risk hedging.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 1, I derived a simple and general model-independent formula for
bilateral CCR metrics, holding for both the cases of reduced-form or structural
default modelling. The COS method for European Options has been extended to
the pricing of Forward and Swaps. CCR metrics for both one-sided and two-sided
payoffs have been computed through the application of a hybrid Fourier-Monte
Carlo procedure. Model calibration and EAD computation have been performed
via the COS method while the first-to-default event has been simulated via a
joint Monte Carlo. The COS method displayed to be fast, accurate and flexible
enough to easily calibrate model parameters around observed values of historical
volatility. While volatility demonstrated to be the key driver in determining
default events, the initial guess for the default trigger exhibited scarce relevance.
The absolute size of CVA displayed to be larger in the case of European Options
with respect to Forward and Swaps.
In Chapter 2, I concluded that there are no theoretical reasons to reconnect
FVA within fair valuation principles. This insight derives from a simplified
framework which displays that the FVA term is affected by dealer dependency.
In fact, this depends on the expected cost for unsecured borrowing faced by
the computing party and on its hedging policy itself. Moreover, if one includes
funding in derivatives valuation, there configure the well known overlap between
the DVA and funding benefits, making the computing counterpart paying twice
the cost of its own default risk. More dramatically, the inclusion of FVA breaks
the Law of Unique Price and poses serious doubts on the ability of the two parties
to agree upon the price of the deal. However, OTC market are characterized by
opaqueness, searching costs and market power so that trades are likely not to be
closed according to fair values.
Funding costs can be rather interpreted as a friction affecting the current
financial market in which agents face restrictions on the access to funding
instruments. The FVA is responsible of some widening in the bid-ask spread
that the dealer quotes to their clients. In the Chapter, I quantified the size of
such widening as the sum of the expected funding costs faced by computing
party in the cases of being long and short on the trade. Nevertheless, in the
case the trader desk faces a liquid own bond market, it can adopt a symmetric
funding strategy called Balance-Sheet Shrinkage which drives the bid-ask spread
widening collapsing to zero. BSS is based on investing funding cash inflows
in repurchasing previously issued debt. In the light of current negative nearly
risk-free rates for short maturities, BSS appears to be quite appealing for those
who cope with a liquid own bond market. Otherwise if a symmetric funding
policy cannot be attained, the size of the bid-ask spread widening is significant.
My work extends the results of Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) which argue that the
FVA, interpreted as additive price correction, disappears in the case of no haircut
(i.e. the trader can borrow at the risk-free rate) to a more general case. In fact,
I believe that symmetric borrowing and lending rates suffice in eliminating the
FVA related bid-ask spread widening through a compensation effect. In the
case of MVA however, which can be thought as the closest relative of FVA, the
compensation effect cannot materialize since the Initial Margins always configure
as cash outflows asked by CCPs which need to be financed. As a consequence,
even in case of a symmetric funding policy, an impact of MVA exists and is on
average higher compared to that of FVA.
In Chapter 3, I have proposed a simple procedure to calculate state-dependent
stochastic recovery rates which reflect the severity of occurred defaults. That
is made possible by sampling from a properly calibrated Beta distribution. I
defined a state random variable representing the relative Gaussian distance of
occurred default from default barrier triggers. I have found a deep relation
between volatility and the expected value of stochastic recoveries. Since average
historical recovery rates displayed to be inconsistent with respect to calibrated
levels of implied volatilities, I would suggest to perform an ex-ante study of
volatility prior to approximate stochastic recoveries with fixed ones.
Within the Sensitivity Analysis, I showed that bilateral CCR metrics react
significantly to both credit and volatility shocks. Interestingly, I singled out
an asymmetric behaviour of bilateral CVA Vega sensitivity with respect to
negative rather then positive volatility shocks. In fact, both the CVA and
DVA displayed a large reduction in case of negative volatility shocks while they
showed a limited growth in correspondence of positive ones. Such evidence might
suggest the existence of an empirical upper bound of bilateral CCR adjustments
responsiveness to volatility shocks.
In conclusion, as the regulatory measures aimed at mitigating counterparty
risk among market participants will fully entry into force, I expect the residual
size of pure CCR adjustments to decrease. On the other side, the counter
effect might be the growth of IM and other margining costs widening bid-ask
spreads. In presence of high competitiveness and constraints in quoting oversized
bid-ask spreads to clients, I expect to observe smaller profitability for the trading
business which might cause the acquisition of more and more market shares by
a concentrated pool of few large dealers facing better average funding.
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